The Problem of Creative Collaboration by Casey, Anthony & Sawicki, Andres
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2016
The Problem of Creative Collaboration
Anthony Casey
Andres Sawicki
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony Casey & Andres Sawicki, "The Problem of Creative Collaboration," Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics, No. 761 (2016).
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2772710 
CHICAGO 
COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 761 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVE COLLABORATION 
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
March 2016 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2772710 
1 
 
 
 
The Problem of Creative Collaboration 
 
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki 
 
In this Article, we explore a central problem facing 
creative industries: how to organize collaborative creative 
production? We identify informal rules as a significant and 
pervasive—but nonetheless overlooked—tool for solving that 
problem. While existing literature has focused on the role 
that informal rules play in creating incentives for the 
production of creative work, we demonstrate how such rules 
can be even more influential in facilitating and organizing 
collaboration in the creative space.  
We also suggest that informal rules are often a better fit 
for organization than formal law. Unique features of 
creativity, especially high uncertainty and low verifiability, 
create organizational challenges that formal law cannot 
address, as demonstrated by recent high profile cases like 
Garcia v. Google. But certain informal rules can meet these 
challenges and facilitate organization where law fails to do 
so. We explain how informal rules functioning through 
mechanisms like reputation and trust can sustain an 
organizational solution without a manager, a hierarchical 
firm, or formal law allocating control rights. Finally, we 
sketch out the dynamics in hybrid situations of creative 
organization where informal rules function alongside formal 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A central problem that faces any creative team is how to 
organize collaboration. Virtually all of creative production 
involves the combination of multiple inputs. Some of those 
inputs are major while others are minor. A film, for example, 
will include writing, acting, set design, costume production, 
editing, and the like. These creative inputs must be 
organized; and part of that organization includes decisions 
over who controls inputs and the final output.  
The complicated nature of these questions has been 
highlighted in recent high profile cases like Garcia v. 
Google1 and 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin.2 Both cases grappled 
with the question of how much control an input provider had 
over the use of a specific input (and therefore also over the 
end product which contained the input). The opinions in 
these cases raised more questions than they answered about 
what it means to be an author for purposes of copyright law, 
what it means to control a creative work, and what even 
qualifies as a creative work.  
The hypothesis we explore in this article is that courts 
struggle to decide these—and many other—disputes in 
creative industries because the parties never intended for 
formal law to resolve them. Instead, a complex set of 
informal rules that only tangentially intersect with formal 
law regulates the behavior of creative collaborators. Courts 
are nonetheless confronted with these kinds of disputes (in 
at least some instances, as in Garcia, this can happen when 
one of the participants is not a member of the creative 
community). When this happens, courts superimpose rigid 
concepts from formal copyright law onto the flexible and 
messy reality of creative collaboration. At best, those courts 
create elaborate fictions to mimic informal norms; at worst, 
they get things completely wrong, potentially undermining 
the informal norms required for creative collaboration to 
operate in the ordinary course.  
While formal copyright law nominally applies to 
determine who controls the output of creative work, creative 
production poses organizational problems that formal 
copyright law simply cannot solve. Instead, informal rules 
operating through mechanisms like trust and reputation 
                                                 
1 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
2 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015).  
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regulate collaboration throughout the creative industries. 
The significant and pervasive role that informal rules play 
in organizing creative collaboration means that copyright 
theory must account for the dynamics of informal rules to 
reach an accurate understanding of how to allocate control of 
creative production. But it currently does not.  
This suggests that informal rules play a more important 
role than copyright theorists have recognized. Others have 
suggested that informal rules create incentives for creative 
production in “negative spaces”—such as cuisine, stand-up 
comedy, and tattoos—where copyright protection is 
unavailable.3 But this views the influence of informal rules 
on creativity too narrowly. 
Informal rules in fact cover everything from how 
producers and directors decide when a film is finished, to 
how co-authors share ideas, to how musicians choose band 
mates. In this way, informal rules regulate film, theater, 
music, television, and publishing. These are not negative 
spaces on copyright’s periphery.4 These are industries at the 
                                                 
3 Copyright may be unavailable for various reasons. Legal doctrine may 
limit its scope; litigation costs may make enforcement impractical; or 
community preferences that operate outside of the conventional legal 
system may dominate behavior. See Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von 
Hippel, Norm-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French 
Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 191 (2008) (noting the absence of effective 
copyright law in the relationships among haute cuisine chefs in France); 
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): 
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of 
Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) (exploring the lack 
of a “cost-effective way [for comics to] protect[] the essence of their 
creativity”); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of 
Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1130-40 (2007) (challenging existing 
explanations, based on doctrinal limitations, for the lack of protection for 
novel cuisine); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 511 (2013) (setting out the challenges to legal protection for 
tattoos). The new consensus is that in these marginal “negative spaces” 
of intellectual property, informal rules operate in place of formal law to 
prevent freeriding and to encourage creative production. See Elizabeth L. 
Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317 
(2011); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: 
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1687, 1769-75 (2006) (cataloging potential negative spaces). 
4 See Rosenblatt, supra note 3 (defining the idea of negative spaces); see 
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3, at 199 (arguing that norm-based 
IP systems arise where formal law is “inadequate or unsatisfactory”); 
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1789-90 (arguing that copyright law 
is inadequate to protect the work of stand-up comics); Perzanowski, 
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core of copyright’s domain. Informal rules are essential to 
creative production—including activity at the very center of 
the copyright industries—because they are the key 
mechanism shaping the organization of collaborative work.  
The centrality of informal rules for all kinds of 
collaborative creative production makes urgent the need to 
understand how they interact, and potentially conflict, with 
formal law. Otherwise, statutory grants of ownership or 
judicial interpretations of formal copyright law can interfere 
with long established norms of creative collaboration in 
complex and unforeseen ways. In the best case, norms and 
informal rules will evolve to work around this interference. 
In the worst case, the formal law will hinder norms of 
creative collaboration. Understanding how this interaction 
plays out is therefore crucial to a coherent theory of 
copyright law. And cases like Garcia and Merkin will only 
make sense once that understanding is in hand. 
Our analysis connects an extensive academic literature 
on organizational theories—with a focus on theories of firms 
and teams—to an emerging literature on informal rules in 
intellectual property.5 By linking these two literatures, we 
                                                                                                                  
supra note 3, at 567 (describing cultural aversion in tattoo to formal law 
that renders reliance on copyright law unacceptable). 
5 We forge new ground in revealing the importance of informal rules for 
organizing collaborative creation in the copyright space. For work 
exploring adjacent areas involving informal rules and private ordering in 
the use and production of information, see BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, 
MICHAEL J. MADISON, & KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG, GOVERNING 
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (2015) (exploring the governance of knowledge 
commons); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann, & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010) (same); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF 
NETWORKS (2006) (exploring organization of modular inputs in 
creativity); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on 
Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161 
(2000) (applying transaction cost theories to explain how formal law 
affects private ordering solutions to problems facing creative 
collaborations); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms 
of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (exploring 
the interaction between the formal law of patents and scientific sharing 
norms); Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source 
Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661543 
(2004) (describing non-state institutional solutions to appropriability 
problems in the production of technical information); Arti Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999) (studying the influence of 
informal rules on inter-team collaboration in the production of science). 
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develop the novel hypothesis that informal rules are the 
primary driver behind the organization of collaborative 
creative production. The IP-and-organizational-theory 
literature has focused primarily on the influence of formal 
law rather than informal rules on the organization of 
creative production. The IP-norms literature has focused on 
the influence of informal rules on individual incentives 
rather than organization. To bridge this divide, we explain 
how informal rules enforced through mechanisms like 
reputation and trust directly affect how creators organize 
their collaborative activity. 
The result is a form of network or community governance 
and control that suggests that copyright law’s obsessive 
attempts at tying together authorship, ownership, and 
control are futile. For whatever the law will tell us about 
who owns a copyrighted product, the facts on the ground will 
tell us something quite different about who controls and 
creates it. Formal rules might be designed to cleanly allocate 
ownership on the assumption that control travels with 
ownership; but informal rules may adapt to frustrate those 
designs and allocate control wherever the creative 
community sees fit. And formal law that overrides those 
norms and forcibly consolidates control (if that is even 
possible) will have dramatic and unforeseen effects on the 
network of creative production. 
In developing this theory, we also explore the potential 
downsides to informal rules. For example, informal rules can 
introduce bias into decisions where formal law might be 
more even handed. Reputation (intentionally or not) 
transfers and perpetuates the bias of those who pass that 
reputation on. More subtly, informal rules and norms can be 
manipulated to favor certain groups or certain traits over 
others. And they are amorphous enough to be invoked 
inconsistently to serve agendas that are less than 
transparent. These concerns are particularly relevant in 
light of the recent and well-publicized gender and racial 
disparities in opportunities and pay in the film, television, 
and other creative industries. 
Finally, we sketch out the landscape of potential 
interactions among formal law, informal rules, and the 
organization of creative collaborative production. In some 
instances, informal rules might substitute for formal law; if 
copyright law leaves an area largely unregulated (as is the 
case for improvisational comedy), informal rules may act 
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alone to support creative collaboration. In other instances, 
formal law and informal rules may be complements; in 
television, for example, formal copyright law’s derivative 
work right may grant power to managers sufficient to enable 
the manager to organize the team, but informal rules 
governing credit for work may further support these 
hierarchical collaborations. In still other instances, formal 
law may crowd out informal rules (and vice versa); non-
Western cultural models that import Western copyright law 
may undermine existing informal rules that are necessary to 
support particular forms of creative collaboration.6  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the 
literatures on creative organizations and on norms and 
customs. We show how these areas of study intersect in 
creative collaboration to raise important new questions. Part 
II describes the challenges of creative collaboration and 
demonstrates that formal law is insufficient to address those 
challenges. Part III first explores how informal rules 
enforced through mechanisms like trust and reputation can 
be the central organizational rules for creative collaboration; 
it then demonstrates how creative collaboration may be 
governed by informal rules that exist entirely outside of a 
firm or management hierarchy. Part IV provides examples of 
these mechanisms at work and identifies important 
implications of this analysis, showing how it can be applied 
to understand challenging questions like those presented in 
Garcia and Merkin.  
I. CONNECTING THEORIES OF INFORMAL RULES TO 
THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 
Classic intellectual property incentives theory holds that 
creative works are public goods, so only formal rights to 
exclude others will provide creators sufficient incentives to 
produce them.7 Two separate strands of scholarship have 
undermined this theory. The first analyzes informal rules8 
                                                 
6 For example, when the law fails to define authorship in peculiar cases, 
there is no back up norm to provide any guidance to the parties. See 
Casey & Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1713 
(2013) (discussing difficult authorship cases where neither law nor 
custom could cleanly identify the “author”). 
7 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 281, 293-94 (1970).  
8 Terms like “custom,” “norm,” and “informal rule” are used to mean 
many things. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom 
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that guide the creation of intellectual property. Building on 
customs-and-norms work in other fields,9 scholars in this 
tradition have shown that informal rules can also provide 
the incentives traditionally provided by intellectual property 
law.10  
The second strand approaches intellectual property 
problems from the perspective of the theory of the firm, an 
economic literature devoted to understanding how and why 
production is organized in a firm rather than a market.11 
This work has shown that intellectual property law 
influences not only creators’ motivation to produce, but also 
the organizational structures in which creators produce. 
Both strands of literature address intellectual property 
generally. For the purposes of this article, we focus more 
narrowly on copyright. We do so because creative work in 
the artistic and expressive fields regulated by copyright law 
                                                                                                                  
in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1900-01 n. 1 (2007) 
(collecting sources demonstrating the various uses of these terms). And 
very fine lines can be drawn for any definition. See Robert Ellickson, A 
Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987) (identifying five types of rules—personal ethics, 
norms, contract, organizational, and governmental—and five types of 
sanction—self-sanction, personal self-help, vicarious self-help, 
organizational, and state). To illustrate our point simply, we will 
generally divide our analysis into two categories: 1) informal rules— 
rules enforced through non-state sanction; and 2) formal law—rules 
enforced by state sanction.  
9 See, for example, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); 
Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System, Extralegal Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); ROBERT 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); STEWART MACAULEY, NON-
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS IN BUSINESS: A PRELIMINARY STUDY (1963). 
10 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3; Fauchart & von Hippel, note 3. 
11 See generally, R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 
389 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: 
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 113–14 (1971); 
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, 
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 785–95 (1972); 
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 
98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1125–49 (1990); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. 
Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, 
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978); 
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 691 (1986); Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, Incomplete 
Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the 
Past 25 Years?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 183 (2011). 
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may differ from creative work in the technical and scientific 
fields regulated by patent law.12  
In this Part, we review the implications of these 
literatures for copyright law and identify important 
questions revealed by their nexus. 
A. Encouraging Creative Production 
The literature on informal rules and creativity has 
focused either on identifying norms that fill gaps where 
formal intellectual property law is weak (e.g., the fashion, 
food, or stand-up comedy industries), or on identifying how 
the legal system should (or should not) use norms and 
customs to guide the design of intellectual property law. A 
particular (though not exclusive) focus of this literature has 
been on industries (plausibly or not quite) covered by 
copyright.13 
These questions have generally been approached with 
the classic intellectual property story in mind. According to 
that story, producers have insufficient incentives to produce 
creative goods unless there are barriers to copying.14 The 
traditional policy response to this problem is to create 
intellectual property laws that impose legal penalties on 
those who copy creative goods without permission.15  
While this story accurately describes a wide range of 
creative activity, IP scholars have explored several ways in 
which it is incomplete. The IP-and-norms literature 
emphasizes that formal law is not the only mechanism that 
can prevent copying. Instead, social norms can plausibly do 
                                                 
12 Research in the interdisciplinary field of creativity studies has 
suggested that this is the case. See John Baer, The Case for the Domain 
Specificity of Creativity, 2 CREATIVITY RES. J. 173 (1998). For example, 
perhaps participants in technical or scientific fields can generate 
predictable and objective criteria to measure whether an input has 
successfully contributed to the creative process; this would enable a 
different set of solutions to creative collaborations in those fields than is 
possible in the artistic and expressive fields regulated by copyright law. 
We do not here express a view on the particular characteristics that 
might distinguish the technical and scientific fields; we only note that it 
is possible that they differ from those in the artistic and expressive 
fields, and that a full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of the 
present Article. 
13 See supra note 3. 
14 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1790. 
15 Id. 
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a lot of the same work.16 Social norms that punish 
unauthorized imitation might substitute for formal legal 
barriers to copying, and thereby preserve incentives to 
produce creative goods.17  
These norms, we are told, spring up in the “negative 
spaces” where formal protection is weak. They provide a 
substitute for the incentive-generating force of formal law. 
Thus, whether legal protection is merely unavailable under 
prevailing doctrine,18 impractical or impossible because of 
specific industry characteristics,19 or supplanted by other 
community preferences,20 its weakness creates a vacuum for 
informal law to fill.  
For example, in the world of stand-up comics, formal law 
does very little to protect jokes.21 A stand-up comic who 
creates a new joke cannot (for doctrinal and social reasons) 
turn to formal law to prevent another comic from telling the 
same joke. But that negative space is filled by an informal 
                                                 
16 Foundational work on social norms can be found in both property 
literature and contract literature. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW (1991) (describing private ordering among ranchers in Shasta 
County, California that rendered government-provided rules irrelevant); 
Stewart Macauley, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AMER. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (exploring the informal rules 
governing business relations in manufacturing); Lisa Bernstein, Opting 
out of the Legal System, Extralegal Relations in the Diamond Industry, 
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law 
in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). More recently, others have 
examined how social norms might affect the structuring of transactions 
so as to prevent disputes from arising, rather than resolving them after 
they occur. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 
281 (2013) (describing cooperative norms in Silicon Valley that drive 
large technology firms to avoid poaching teams of engineers from start-
ups and instead to pursue acqui-hires, in which venture capitalists and 
early investors receive payments when the large firm absorbs all of the 
start-up’s engineering talent). 
17 See generally Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3 (describing anti-copying 
norms in stand-up comedy); Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3 
(describing anti-copying norms in French cuisine). It is also possible that 
industry norms complement or subvert legal rules regarding copying. 
See, e.g., Lior Strahelivitz, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003) (exploring the 
emergence of social norms of copying in the file sharing space); Oliar & 
Sprigman, supra note 3; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3. 
18 Compare Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3 at 191, and Buccafusco, 
supra note 3, at 1130-40. 
19 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1790; Perzanowski, supra note 
3. 
20 See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 3. 
21 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1817-18. 
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rule: comics should not tell jokes previously told by other 
comics. Those who have been credibly accused of violating 
this norm incur penalties from the community of stand-up 
comics.22 These penalties are both non-economic penalties 
(in the form of reduced social status) and economic penalties 
(lost bookings).23  
Similarly, French chefs exist in a world of weak formal 
law. Copyright law does not provide meaningful protection 
for novel recipes developed by those chefs.24 But the 
community regulates (mis)appropriation: the chefs 
understand that members of their community will refuse to 
engage in mutually beneficial information exchange with 
chefs who have been credibly accused of copying recipes from 
other chefs.25 
The IP and norms literature both confirms and 
contradicts the classical theory. On the one hand, it confirms 
the incentive story that tells us creators need protection 
from free-riding by rivals to draw them into creative 
production.26 On the other hand, the literature rejects the 
suggestions of some classical theories that formal law is the 
necessary and exclusive means of protection for these 
industries.  
B. Organizing Creative Production 
The classic theory of copyright law has another unrelated 
shortcoming: it generally assumes that a sole creator acts 
alone to produce creative work.27 This assumption is 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Similar dynamics—though complicated in part by the role of 
trademark law—may also be at play in the fashion industry. See 
Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006); Raustiala & 
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009); 
Hemphill and Suk, Reply Remix and Cultural Production, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 1227 (2009). 
24 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3. 
25 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3. Other areas of creative 
production may also have similar norms. See, e.g., Perzanowski supra 
note 3. 
26 See Breyer, supra note 7 at 293-94. That story of the need for 
incentives (formal or informal) is not without its critics. See id. at 294-
323 (challenging the empirical underpinnings for the standard 
justification of copyright law).  
27 See BENKLER, supra note 5, at 42 (describing the “ideal-type strategy 
that underlies patents and copyrights” as resting on a conception “of the 
information producer as a single author or inventor laboring creatively”). 
12 
 
consistent with popular western conceptions of creative 
production.28 But it is inconsistent with how creativity 
actually occurs. Virtually all creative work is collaborative or 
cumulative.29 The collaborative nature of most creative work 
means that there are crucial organizational issues facing 
creators that classic theory simply does not address.  
This is where the scholarship on the organization of 
intellectual production comes in. Consider the possibility 
that two creative inputs must be combined to produce a 
finished product.30 Formal intellectual property law does not 
protect creative inputs from appropriation, at least not 
during the course of much of the production process.31 Still, 
creative goods are commonly produced by a team of people, 
each of whom provides creative inputs to the joint project. 
Such a team faces the risk of shirking by teammates because 
it will often be hard to observe or verify whether each team 
member is carrying her weight, and because the team 
members’ efforts produce a single inseparable good.32  
                                                 
28 See supra note 5.  
29 Rebecca Tushnet notes “The concept of Romantic authorship has come 
under sustained analytic assault, as scholars have demonstrated that all 
works derive from other works.” Rebecca Tushnet, The Romantic Author 
and the Romance Writer: Resisting Gendered Concepts of Creativity, 
(forthcoming); see also sources cited supra note 3; Casey & Sawicki, 
supra note 6; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming). 
30 In the non-creative context, where inputs are tangible assets managed 
by different people who cannot write perfectly complete contracts, the 
standard property-rights solution to this sort of problem is integration. 
Hart & Moore, supra note 11, at 1125–49; see also Philippe Aghion & 
Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What 
Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 183 
(2011). 
31 Copyright protection begins only upon fixation. See generally Casey & 
Sawicki, supra note 6. 
32 Additional organizational theories tell us how intellectual property 
law can affect production that combines creative and non-creative goods. 
Pioneering research by Robert Merges & Ashish Arora and Dan Burk & 
Brett McDonnell explores this question. They used the theory of the firm 
lens to understand formal intellectual property law and provide insights 
into its influence on market transactions and integration trends in tech 
industries. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input 
Markets, and the Value of Intangible Assets *5 (unpublished draft, Feb 9, 
1999), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/iprights.pdf (visited June 5, 
2013); Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, 
Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 
(2004); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: 
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 575; Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 
13 
 
In many production functions outside the context of 
creative collaborations, the costs of shirking can be reduced 
by contract or—where contracts are incomplete—through 
the imposition of the hierarchical management structure of 
a firm.33 These mechanisms are often provided by a 
particular kind of firm—a hierarchy with a manager at the 
top.34  
Creative collaborators, however, will find firm structures 
more difficult to design. The problem they face is how to 
monitor or control teams when the members are providing 
inseparable contributions that are difficult to observe.35 To 
solve this problem, creative collaboration requires (more so 
than other endeavors) either (1) a special monitoring 
mechanism that can compensate non-verifiable effort or (2) a 
special enforcement mechanism that can reward or punish 
entire teams based on output.36 As explained below, this is 
because the nature of a creative input is that it is hard to 
define and measure. It is hard to observe—and even harder 
to verify—whether each writer in a group jointly writing a 
novel contributed her best ideas and efforts. Or whether a 
pair of actors put in their best effort rather than hold back 
because they do not like the director’s style. Or whether the 
members of a band brought the right energy level to a stage 
performance. 
The organizational solution to these team production 
problems can take one of two general forms. First, the 
creative inputs may hire a manager who closely monitors 
each input to detect shirking.37 Alternatively, where even a 
monitor cannot observe effort, the creative inputs may hire a 
                                                                                                                  
U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1649 (2009); Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of 
Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (2011); Érica Gorga & Michael 
Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: 
Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1123 
(2007). 
33 Coase, supra note 11; Williamson, supra note 11. 
34 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 11; Coase, supra note 11; Williamson 
supra note 11. 
35 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. See also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra 
note 29; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 1683 (2014). 
36 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
37 Alchian & Demsetz, supra, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Casey & Sawicki, supra 
note 6. 
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manager who measures the team’s total output, and enforces 
penalties or rewards depending on whether that output 
passed some threshold.38  
Formal law can, in limited circumstances, facilitate these 
structures and the creative collaborations they serve to some 
degree. We have explored this point in prior work.39 But 
formal law is not the only factor influencing the design of 
such organizational structures.40 Indeed, it is not even the 
most important. Rather, the limitations on formal law as an 
organizational device in the production of copyrightable 
works create a vast organizational negative space where 
formal law has no (or at most severely limited) influence. 
The existence of robust collaboration in the creative 
industries despite this negative space suggests that there 
are informal rules at work. If that is the case, and we think 
it is, the next steps are to identify and evaluate those 
informal rules. We do so in the following parts. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVE COLLABORATION AND THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF FORMAL LAW 
In this Part we explore how informal rules can address 
the organizational challenges of creative collaboration. We 
first introduce the organizational challenges and then 
examine potential solutions. We show that while the 
managerial hierarchy of a firm can sometimes organize 
creative collaborative activity, in this realm the law 
necessary to support such organization is significantly 
limited.  
A. The Challenges of Creative Collaboration 
Suppose that two authors—Jane and Toni—wish to 
jointly write a novel. Four factors will affect their ability to 
collaborate: observability, verifiability, allocation, and 
certainty.41 The more these factors are present the easier it 
                                                 
38 See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL. J. ECON. 324 
(1982); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
39 Id. at 1721-38 (showing how derivate rights law can create a reward 
mechanism that facilitates team collaboration and how work-made-for-
hire and joint-works doctrine can either facilitate or hinder collaboration 
depending on specific design).  
40 Balganesh, supra note 29; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29.. 
41 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
15 
 
will be for the authors to collaborate. But these factors tend 
to be absent in creative activities.  
First, it is difficult for each author to observe the effort of 
the other. If Jane sees Toni sitting in a coffee shop, she 
cannot easily know whether Toni is simply daydreaming or, 
instead, is thinking hard about how to use prose to convey a 
character’s insanity. As a result, Jane cannot effectively 
punish Toni for failing to put forth the effort she promised to 
exert.  
Second, it is difficult for anyone to verify the level of each 
author’s performance. Jane cannot demonstrate to a court 
that Toni has been keeping her best prose to herself rather 
than putting it into their joint novel.42  
Third, the result of their collaboration—a novel—will 
resist attempts to allocate or assign output value to the 
separate inputs from the respective authors. If a scene in the 
novel is excellent, it will be difficult to know whether its 
excellence is attributable to the person who first drafted it, 
to the one who edited it, to the one who wrote the preceding 
scene, to the one who thought up the setting for the scene, 
and so on.  
Finally, the potential value of their collaboration is 
uncertain. Because the work is creative, it will be hard to 
predict in advance how much it could possibly be worth.43 As 
a result, the parties cannot simply agree to produce a novel 
of a given value.44  
B. The Role of Managers 
Because observability, verifiability, allocation, and 
certainty are lacking, Jane and Toni will find it difficult to 
collaborate on their own. Instead, they might try to organize 
their efforts by hiring a manager.45 Rather than relying on 
price signals (or their own good will) to allocate resources, 
Jane and Toni can create a hierarchy with a manager at the 
top.46 In this hierarchy, perhaps the manager can add to the 
work’s observability or verifiability. The manager can closely 
monitor Jane and Toni in an attempt to determine whether 
                                                 
42 Observability and verifiability are not necessarily coextensive. In some 
cases, one author may have observed the other’s laziness but be unable 
to verify it to an outsider like a court. 
43 Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 333, 363-64 (2012). 
44 Id. 
45 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1701-12. 
46 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 11. 
16 
 
either is shirking, and to document that shirking.47 This can 
work if the reason that Jane and Toni could not observe was 
because they were busy creating inputs, or because 
individuals vary in their skill at observing others.  
In many creative endeavors, though, the lack of 
observability stems not from the limitation on monitoring 
resources or skill, but from the inherent nature of the 
creative work itself. Not even the most diligent or skilled 
monitor can distinguish daydreaming from creative 
thought.48  
Where no one—including the manager—can observe or 
verify the creative inputs, the manager still has a role to 
play. The manager can enforce penalties (or rewards) on 
both Jane and Toni if their joint output is below (or above) a 
threshold. These rewards provide a substitute for 
monitoring.  
If Toni and Jane each benefits from shirking, but a 
manager cannot observe or verify who shirked, the manager 
can still punish the entire team whenever the project is 
unsuccessful. If the entire team is punished when the end 
product is unsatisfactory, Toni and Jane will have an 
incentive to perform. The punishment eliminates the value 
for anyone tempted to shirk.49  
This role requires some level of certainty about what is a 
good product and what is a bad product. Importantly, 
though, that certainty need not exist ex ante. The manager 
may be able to enforce penalties based on a threshold that is 
only known after production is complete. This avoids the 
need to spend prohibitive sums predicting and planning for 
countless contingencies, as would be required of a team 
relying on formal contract law. 
For example, imagine a blockbuster movie is set to 
release next summer. The threshold for a “good” opening 
weekend turns on the state of the economy, the state of the 
movie industry, the weather, and many other factors that 
cannot be known when the creative inputs are initially 
contracting to work on the movie, or even during 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 That may one day change. See Siyuan Liu, et al, Neural Correlates of 
Lyrical Improvisation: An fMRI Study of Freestyle Rap, 2 Scientific 
Reports (Nov 15, 2012) (suggesting the possibility of technology to detect 
brain waves associated with creative activity). 
49 Holmström, supra note 51. 
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production.50 After the opening weekend has passed, many 
of these factors will become known. The manager can use 
that knowledge to retroactively reward or punish the team. 
If the team members know that the manager will use later-
revealed information to allocate rewards and enforce 
penalties, they know that they will be compensated in 
proportion to the relative success of the team. They will be 
punished or rewarded based on the value the team added 
and not based on the fortuities of the weather. The manager 
can thus effectively elicit effort on the collaborative work. 
To summarize the point, creative inputs face a 
monitoring challenge when collaborating. By organizing into 
a managerial hierarchy, the inputs can prevent shirking. 
The manager who can observe will be able to police effort. 
The manager who can reward will be able to align incentives 
without observation.51 The manager retains the residual 
claim, which grants her the power to reward, punish, and 
reallocate.52 
C. Why Formal Law Is Ineffective in Organizing 
Collaboration 
Managerial oversight is, however, imperfect. Neither 
contract rights nor property rights can completely allocate 
control over creative collaboration.53 This is true because the 
four factors discussed above (observability, verifiability, 
                                                 
50 One could imagine a contract that contemplates these possibilities. 
But a contract covering the infinite possible states of the world would be 
costly to draft and negotiate. Such negotiation, even if theoretically 
possible, would be prohibitively expensive. For practical purposes, then, 
we can assume such a contract cannot be written.  
51 In its pure form, this structure demands that the manager must not be 
an input provider. Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL. 
J. ECON. 324, 338 (1982). In practice, the level of managerial input is 
likely a factor that impacts the effectiveness of the manager. In the 
creative context, it may also be that the manager provides non-creative 
inputs. 
52 In the copyright context, this suggests that the law’s focus on 
authorship to determine ownership and control is misguided. It also 
suggests that post-production rights like derivative works may serve 
reward functions that can be used to facilitate collaboration on the 
original work. See generally Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
53 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1690-1700; Anthony J. Casey, Mind 
Control: Firms and the Production of Ideas, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
(2012). 
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allocation and certainty) are often scarce in creative 
collaboration.54  
With contracts about creativity, for instance, parties will 
often lack the ability to observe or verify outcomes. When 
that is true, they will find it difficult to write a contract by 
which a manager can oversee efforts. A contractual right to 
require a creative input’s best idea is not enforceable when 
the relative quality of the idea cannot be observed, verified, 
or predicted. Similarly, a contract term that requires a 
collaborator to be a “team player” is particularly hard to 
enforce when the team is engaged in creating things like 
movie scenes, characters for a story, or character chemistry 
in a play.55 
Management through property rights can be even more 
difficult. Property rights are generally thought to facilitate 
organization where one input provider or manager can take 
ownership of the crucial assets.56 This gives that person 
residual control over those assets and, thus over the project. 
Using that control, the manager can direct other input 
providers, and then punish and reward collaboration 
through profits from the project57 or through access to the 
project.58  
As a preliminary matter, if all inputs in the collaboration 
are creative ideas, managers may have no property rights to 
control because copyright does not extend to ideas.59 
Without property rights, the manager has no access or 
control rights that she can wield as a carrot or a stick to 
                                                 
54 For an interesting analysis of the observability and certainty problems 
in a creative industry, see Robert R. Faulkner & Andrew B. Anderson, 
Short-term Projects and Emergent Careers: Evidence from Hollywood, 92 
AM. J. SOC. 879, 885 (1987) (describing the connection between “means 
and ends” in film as “obscure and uncertain,” comparing the film 
industry to gambling and wildcat oil drilling, and providing examples of 
the uncertainty filmmakers face). 
55 Casey, supra note 53. 
56 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1690-1700 (summarizing a basic 
property-rights theory of firms). 
57 Holmström, supra note 51. 
58 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 
113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998) (presenting an access-based theory of firms 
and property rights). 
59 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (providing that “[i]n no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea . . . 
embodied in such work”); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding 
that copyright law protects expression, not the underlying ideas).  
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encourage optimal performance.60 Moreover, even if the 
manager possesses some property rights relevant to the 
creative collaboration (in complementary assets, for 
example), those rights will provide little protection to a 
manager-owner who cannot observe inputs, allocate outputs, 
or predict outcomes. The threat to withhold property or 
access to property as a punishment for lack of collaborative 
effort is of little value when the manager cannot observe, 
verify, or allocate levels of collaborative effort in the first 
place.  
At best, imperfect mechanisms of rewards and 
punishments can be cobbled together through a combination 
of contract and property rights. Thus, for example, 
derivative works rights—if allocated to a team manager—
might serve as a reward that can be doled out ex post to 
encourage collaboration.61 The manager can use the promise 
of inclusion in future derivative projects as a carrot. But 
these reward systems will be imprecise and depend on 
conditions that are not universally present. For example, a 
reward based on derivative works rights can facilitate 
collaboration only when a project is likely to produce 
valuable works “based upon” the original work.62 If the 
project is plainly a one-off collaboration, no such reward is 
available. Similarly, a team member needs to have a 
reasonable expectation that she is a plausible participant in 
future projects in order for access to future projects to serve 
as a carrot for cooperation on the current project.63  
Thus, a large space exists where formal law cannot 
facilitate collaboration. And yet collaboration flourishes and 
occupies nearly the whole of the creative market. There will 
of course be creative activities that are relatively more or 
less collaborative than others. Movies involve massive 
collaborations of dozens of people or more. Plays may involve 
                                                 
60 See Hart & Moore, supra note 11 (developing a theory of the firm that 
depends on property rights to allocate residual control over assets); 
Rajan & Zingales, supra note 58 (developing a theory of the firm that 
depends on property rights to control access to assets). 
61 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon 
one or more preexisting works”). 
63 For example, an actor playing a character that dies in a movie may 
have no plausible expectation of being involved in a sequel. 
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fewer. Books may involve even fewer.64 The implication of 
our analysis is that informal rules will be of greater 
importance for the more collaborative activities. But the 
bulk of creativity has a significant direct or indirect 
collaborative component, suggesting that this role of 
informal rules will be a central and core feature of most 
creative activity. 
III. MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING INFORMAL RULES  
We suggest that there exists a set of informal rules that 
facilitates or substitutes for the role of a manager in 
organizing creative collaboration. At a high level of 
generality, these informal rules may include imperatives 
such as (1) do not shirk; (2) do not withhold ideas that could 
contribute to the project; and (3) do not appropriate to 
yourself ideas suggested by others.65 Mechanisms that 
punish violations of (or reward compliance with) these rules 
can make it easier to organize creative collaborations by 
punishing team members who do not perform or by making 
it easier for the managers to identify team members who are 
likely to perform in the first instance. 
Informal rules only work if mechanisms exist to ensure 
that behavior complies with them.66 One possible 
mechanism is internalization, in which an individual 
ensures her own compliance with the informal rule simply 
because she prefers to comply.67 Of course, the assumption 
of full internalization is unrealistic and informal rules are 
generally not entirely self-enforcing. Instead, other 
mechanisms such as reputation and trust can provide the 
                                                 
64 Rare indeed is a truly solo author. Even the solo novelist is 
collaborating with her community peers, her mentors, her agent, her 
editors, and those prior artists who influence her work. 
65 The precise specification of the content of these imperatives must 
await empirical investigation.  
66 There is some debate over the terminology to describe the mechanisms 
that transfer informal rules into behavioral regularity. Compare ERIC 
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2001); with Richard McAdams, The 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 339 
(1997); and with Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens: An 
Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1583 
(2000). We will simply refer to informal rules as the desired behavior 
and mechanisms as anything that makes that behavior more likely. We 
explore now what those mechanisms might be. 
67 See Cooter, supra note 66, at 158 (explaining that individuals may 
have a taste or preference for complying with a norm, thereby placing 
intrinsic value on compliance apart from its instrumental value). 
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avenue for enforcing informal rules.68 Trust and reputation 
are closely related and overlapping but play out in different 
ways. In this Part, we explore these mechanisms for 
enforcing informal rules in the context of creative 
collaboration, and their potential costs. 
A. How Managers Can Use Reputation and Trust 
1. Reputation 
We define reputation as information about a person 
obtained from “the collective experience of others who have 
previously dealt with [that] person.”69 Norms-based systems 
frequently rely on reputation to enforce rules.70 Individuals 
who violate an informal rule can be subjected to reputational 
attacks that directly harm them or affect their standing 
among peers.71  
Reputation has several characteristics that make it 
particularly valuable for managers facilitating team 
production. Managers can coordinate creative production if 
they can effectively provide rewards (or enforce penalties) 
when a team produces more (or less) than some threshold. 
Optimally, the manager will have a supply of rewards that is 
not limited by his project budget.72 In most cases that is not 
                                                 
68 McAdams, supra note 66, at 350. 
69 Gilson, Sabel, & Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and 
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1377 (2010) 
70 See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1815 (describing 
reputational attacks as punishment for violation of a norm); Fauchart & 
von Hippel, supra note 3, at 193 (describing a famous chef’s attack on a 
former employee’s reputation in response to the latter’s violation of an 
attribution norm). 
71 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 3, at 189. 
72 The ability to break the budget constraint is important in preventing 
renegotiation. Holmström, supra note 38. For example, there is a project 
that will produce 39 if three team members perform optimally. 
Performance costs 10 each. If anyone shirks the project will earn 33 and 
the shirker will have no cost. The shirker gets 11 surplus from shirking 
and only 3 surplus from performing. But the other team members get 
only 1. To solve this problem the manager has to be able to punish the 
team when it earns only 33. The manager can destroy value and reduce 
the total payout to 0 when the project earns 33 or less (thus the manager 
is not constrained by the actual budget). Now the shirking team member 
gets nothing and has an incentive not to shirk. Or the manager could 
reward performance by paying out 66 whenever the project produced 39 
or more (again the manger is not constrained by the budget). Now the 
team members get 12 from performing and have no incentive to shirk. In 
most contexts, it is difficult to break out of the budget constraint. But 
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possible (budgets constrain most projects). But reputational 
rewards are different. The value (and cost) for reputational 
rewards (and penalties) can be drawn from future projects 
outside of the manager’s budget. In essence, reputational 
rewards can impose no monetary cost on the manager but be 
translated into money in later projects when the productive 
team member will be able to command a premium from her 
future teammates.73  
Reputation also has the benefit of being useful even 
where the performance of team members is observable to the 
manager, but still unverifiable. The manager can tell the 
world that the project failed because team members shirked. 
And, as long as the relevant community has some level of 
confidence in the manager’s judgment, the inability to verify 
the shirking to a court is unimportant. Put simply, the 
manager may have to overcome a higher burden of proof and 
rely on more limited evidence to convince a judge than to 
convince her close-knit circle of peers. The community may 
accept the manager’s statement that “Anne was a miserable 
actress and impossible to deal with in my last movie,” even 
when the manager cannot prove any formal breach of Anne’s 
contract. If so, and if Anne is motivated by seeking the 
renown of her colleagues (or critics or the public at large), 
then she may not shirk even if she would otherwise have a 
pecuniary motivation to do so. 
Additionally, managers may be able to rely on the 
reputation mechanism even in the face of low observability 
(as well as low verifiability, certainty, and allocability). 
Imagine a project that ex ante has an uncertain outcome. 
The effort of each member is unobservable and unverifiable. 
Similarly, output value cannot be allocated to inputs. As 
long as the manager can recognize project failure ex post, 
reputation can still serve to prevent shirking. To see how, 
suppose a project requires effort from various team 
members. If any one of them shirks, there will be some 
amount of failure. Moreover, ex ante, the manager has no 
idea how much a successful project will be worth. But after 
the fact, the manager can determine whether the project 
                                                                                                                  
rewards and penalties enforced through reputation and trust may make 
it possible to do so in the world of creative collaboration. See Holmström, 
supra note 38, at 338–39. 
73 This extends Bengt Holmström’s point that moral hazard in teams can 
be avoided if failure can be punished by precluding future membership 
in the relationship. See Holmström, supra note 38. 
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was a relative failure because previously unknowable 
information has become known,74 like cultural, political, or 
other exogenous events that have made the subject matter of 
a film unappealing. For example, expectations of what 
constitutes a successful debut weekend for a movie opening 
next summer might change in response to an exogenous 
cultural shift (e.g., Donald Trump makes America great 
again) or a weather event (e.g., a hurricane strikes the 
northeast). With hindsight, the manager now knows how 
much a successful project would have produced and can 
judge the teams’ effort based on comparing the outcome to 
that metric.75  
If the team performed poorly, the manager can let that be 
known. This knock to the team members’ reputation is a 
penalty for underperformance. As long as the reputational 
stain is high enough and the members know that the 
manager can impose the penalty, it will be effective in 
discouraging shirking.76  
For any of this to work, the manager’s message to the 
community must be relevant and credible. The industry 
need not know what it was that made Anne a bad actress, 
but it needs to know that there is such a thing as an 
objectively good actress and an objectively bad actress. 
Different traits will, therefore, be more or less susceptible to 
reputational assessment. Several film producers suggested 
to us that reputation is especially useful for questions about 
being a good “team player” (which includes things like 
temperament, cooperation or how the person deals with 
                                                 
74 Exogenous shifts could also make a movie’s success less impressive. 
For example, if a particular genre becomes extremely popular then the 
measure of success for movies in that genre might require better 
performance than was expected when the project began. We have 
suggested elsewhere that a scenario like this may be at play in the movie 
industry and might be a factor in the sequel “reboot” phenomenon. Casey 
& Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1730-31. 
75 For a recent example, consider The Interview, the release of which was 
limited by Sony in response to North Korea’s cyberattack on Sony. In 
this context, the film may be expected to generate very low revenues, 
much lower than would have been expected in the absence of North 
Korea’s action. 
76 Say C was shirking and only provided 5 in work, and was paid 11 of 
the 33 output. If everyone performed C would have been paid 13 of 39 
with an effort of 10. Shirking provides 6 in surplus to C. Not shirking 
provides 3. As long as the reputation penalty to each team member is 
more than 3, reputation will be an effective means of overcoming moral 
hazard. For the full theory behind this outcome, Holmström, supra note 
51; Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
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creative management and critique).77 It appears to be 
possible to objectively determine whether someone is a team 
player. A manager may be able to observe that sort of 
characteristic. Crucially, though she may be unable to 
correct for it through monitoring. And it can be very difficult 
to verify. Under these conditions, the reputational messages 
can be especially important. 
All of this suggests that reputation, by creating a 
mechanism for punishing and rewarding performance when 
contracts and other legal rights fall short, makes it easier for 
creators to work in collaborative groups. This, in turn, 
provides better information to subsequent managers about 
potential new team members. When a creative community 
can rely on credible sources of information about an 
individual’s potential value in a collaboration, a manager 
can more readily make decisions about teammates for future 
projects even though the manager has never before worked 
with those individuals, and the individuals may never have 
worked with each other either. This mixing of teammates 
has been correlated with higher quality creative output.78 
2. Trust 
Trust79 is information obtained by an individual’s own 
experience in prior dealings with a person.80 A manager or 
                                                 
77 The producers viewed themselves as more capable of independently 
judging pure talent and relied less on their network for things that 
might fall under that rubric. 
78 Brian Uzzi & Jarrett Spiro, Collaboration and Creativity: The Small 
World Problem, 111 AM. J. SOC. 447 (2005) (arguing that the quality of 
the creative output in Broadway musicals is a function of the mixing of 
teammates across projects). 
79 There are of course many ways to define trust. See generally Lisa 
Bernstein, Private Ordering, Social Capital, and Network Governance in 
Procurement Contracts: A Preliminary Exploration (Feb. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (examining the various theories on the role of 
trust and social capital in complex commercial transactions). Common 
definitions focus on a belief that a counterparty will not intentionally 
cheat or expectations that involved parties will act to each other’s 
mutual benefit. Id. We use the word trust consistently with those 
definitions but stress the source of the content as the distinguishing 
factor between reputation and trust. 
80 The exact causes or origins of trust are hard to pin down. But 
extensive experimental evidence has established that trust plays an 
important role in human interactions, including those in markets. 
Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 
(2001) (collecting sources and reviewing the experimental literature); 
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team member may have first-hand information about 
another team member, and can then use that information to 
evaluate the person’s suitability for any particular project.  
Trust is more effective when you have a limited number 
of teammates with whom you will engage in repeated 
collaborations.81 After an initial investment in developing 
trust (i.e., getting to know someone), it may be better to 
capture the return on that investment over several 
collaborations.82  
Like reputation, trust can fill a gap left by a lack of 
observability, verifiability, certainty, or allocation. If a team 
of three or more input providers fails, those who performed 
will distrust other members. This will prevent that team 
from existing in that form going forward. Just as reputation 
can tell the market the team is bad and its members should 
not be hired, a lack of trust can tell the team members 
themselves that the team is bad and should not be 
continued. All team members lose out on future 
membership. If that punishment is strong enough and team 
members are aware that it will be applied, it will provide an 
incentive against shirking.  
Trust in the sense used here—as information derived 
from prior interactions with another person—may serve as 
the basis for continuing collaborative efforts. Consider this 
description of Harvey Weinstein’s strategy when he was 
running Miramax’s negotiations to acquire Swingers. The 
filmmakers were insisting on control over the final cut—the 
right to determine when the film was complete and ready for 
distribution.83 This was an unusual demand from the 
                                                                                                                  
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and 
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Jillian J. Jordan, Alexander 
Peysakhovich, & David G. Rand, Why We Cooperate, in Jean Decety & 
Thalia Wheatley, eds., The Moral Brain: Multidisciplinary Perspectives 
(MIT Press 2014).  
81 In our discussion of talent agents above, we suggested that the agents 
were reputation intermediaries. They could of course also be trust 
intermediaries. A producer may trust an agent or may know that agent 
to be of good reputation. Our interviews suggest that the network is 
strong enough that reputation does a lot of work. And thus a producer 
will be willing to work with an agent who she does not personally know 
if that agent has a strong reputation. 
82 Again, our discussions with producers are consistent with this idea. In 
particular they appear to value repeat interactions with directors after 
they learn they can trust each other.  
83 Interviews with producers have suggested a particularly interesting 
set of informal rules around final cuts. Producers generally insist on 
26 
 
filmmakers, especially because they had essentially no track 
record. Yet Weinstein and Miramax agreed to relinquish 
final cut control over Swingers, with an understanding as 
described by one of the key participants in the film: 
 
But this is where the Weinsteins were so 
smart. They started getting the idea of 
“We’re not just buying the movie, we’re 
buying relationships with the 
filmmakers. We’re going to be in 
business with Jon Favreau. We’re going 
to be in business with Vince Vaughn. 
We’re going to be in business with Doug 
Liman. And if we ever want to do 
anything in the future with these guys, 
we’ve got this over their heads to say, 
‘Hey, we started you out.’” It’s just really, 
really smart business.84 
 
A possible inference from the language “if we ever want to 
do anything in the future with these guys, we’ve got this 
over their heads” is that the Weinsteins were signaling their 
ability and willingness to punish violations of their trust by 
extracting concessions in future projects.85 The flip side of 
this is that the Weinsteins’ experience with Favreau, 
Vaughn, and Liman could facilitate future business with 
them—a good final cut on Swingers would make the 
Weinsteins more likely to allow them similar creative 
control over future projects. Producers have an interest in 
developing a relationship with successful filmmakers that 
can lead to future projects. And the personal connections 
                                                                                                                  
retaining final cut rights, but they vary widely in the extent to which 
they exercise those rights. Production companies with a reputation for 
heavy-handed final cuts face a challenge in attracting talented writers, 
directors, and actors. One producer also suggested that this was an area 
where agents played a strong intermediary role collecting and 
communicating reputational information about the use of the final cut 
right. The noteworthy point is that the norms play a much larger role 
than any contract terms. 
84 Alex French & Howie Kahn, So Money: An Oral History of Swingers, 
GRANTLAND (Jan. 22, 2014), http://grantland.com/features/an-oral-
history-swingers/.  
85 We might wonder how the Weinsteins could extract such concessions; 
after all, in future deals, the filmmakers would presumably be free to 
negotiate with any production company. One partial answer to this 
puzzle may be found in the relationship between trust and reputation.  
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that might make that relationship strong can be more 
valuable than specific terms in a contract or even financial 
compensation on the current project.   
The line between trust and reputation is, of course, 
blurry. For example, the line—“if we ever want to do 
anything in the future with these guys, we’ve got this over 
their heads to say, ‘Hey, we started you out’”—could be read 
not only as an explicit statement regarding the trust the 
Weinsteins were vesting in the filmmakers, but also as a 
threat to apply reputational penalties if Favreau, Vaughn, 
or Liman did not perform on this or future projects. If there 
is a norm of loyalty, a reputation for shunning the studio 
that gave you enormous freedom and got you started might 
hurt a filmmaker’s future prospects. The Weinsteins could 
talk to other Hollywood producers and tell a plausible story 
that the filmmakers acted unfairly if, after getting final-cut 
control on their first film, they later played hardball or 
shirked on subsequent projects. On the other hand, the 
statement might be assuming only that individuals simply 
feel an internal duty of loyalty. For our purposes, the key 
observation, however, is simply that the bonds of this 
agreement were informal rules of some form rather than 
formal legal obligations.  
3. The costs associated with reputation and trust 
One disadvantage of reputation as a mechanism for 
enforcing informal rules of collaboration is that its use 
favors generic projects. An input provider’s reputation for 
performing idiosyncratic tasks is not valuable. To be useful, 
reputation must provide information about tasks that will be 
useful to future projects. Work that does not provide 
information applicable to other projects does not produce 
useful reputational information.  
This suggests that the more generic a project is, the more 
future value (in terms of useable reputational information) it 
will generate. Repeat play and generic projects will be 
disproportionately favored because the possibility of doling 
out reputational rewards does not exist to the same extent 
for one-off and idiosyncratic projects. Thus, a generic project 
of low value might be favored over a unique project of high 
value.86 Call this the Marvel hypothesis.87 
                                                 
86 In a sense, reputation produces a contingent future value that can be 
doled out as a reward to keep the team together. Counterintuitively, the 
future contingent value of reputation can be more useful than the 
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We must also consider the possibility that informal rules 
may be a barrier to entry in a way that strong intellectual 
property rights are not.88 Informal rules may systematically 
treat new entrants worse than incumbents. Indeed, the fact 
that informal rules are maintained by incumbents gives us a 
prima facie reason to suspect that they will be designed to 
protect incumbents’ positions against entry.89 For example, 
recall that reputation might be used to inform the selection 
of members in a team. People working in the field will use 
information gleaned from a prospective team member’s past 
performances with other teams to guide their decisions 
whether to add the prospective member to the team for a 
new project. But a new entrant’s reputation will be thin—
she will have had no (or few) past performances that others 
could rely on in deciding whether to add her to their teams. 
At least until a new entrant is able to build a reputation, she 
will find it more difficult to find attractive projects to work 
on than will established players.90 
These barriers may also reduce movement across sectors 
of industry creating silos or pockets of production types. 
Film talent may stay in film, and television talent may stay 
in television because information about inputs does not 
easily transfer across different kinds of projects, even when 
there are surface similarities in the work required (e.g., 
acting on a television show and acting in film). Moreover, 
new talent faces an enormous obstacle to entering the 
industry because it is hard to generate and distribute 
credible information about them. In many situations, then, 
we should worry that the best talent for a particular job is 
                                                                                                                  
present value of the project itself because the reputation can be used to 
bind the team in a way that the present value of the project cannot.  
87 See, e.g., Peter Suderman, Superhero Movies Have Become Too 
Formulaic. Deadpool Makes a Case for Breaking the Mold, VOX (Feb. 17, 
2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/2/17/11021144/deadpool-
superhero-movies-formulaic. 
88 Cf. Perzanowski, supra note 3, at 581-84 (explaining how norms 
against copying custom tattoo designs function as barriers to entry). 
89 Perzanowski, supra note 3, at nn. 596 & 599; Barnett, Private 
Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251 (2004). 
90 There is some data suggesting this barrier is significant in film. See, 
e.g, Faulkner & Anderson, supra note 54 (providing evidence that past 
credits increase the chances of future work and describing the film 
industry as a “rich get richer” environment). 
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passed over simply because managers have better 
information about other talent.91 
Perhaps the most pernicious risk of informal rules is 
their power to entrench biases. Formal law can be 
challenged in courts or through legislation. Informal rules 
are often self-executing or rely on the collective action of a 
community as a whole. Where self-executing rules are 
biased, they will be difficult to dislodge. Similarly, where the 
rules are enforced through collective action of a community, 
the existing biases of that community will dictate the 
manner of enforcement. In either case, the victim of bias 
cannot appeal to a higher or neutral authority. 
Some biases may be benign but others—particularly 
those based on race, gender, sexual orientation or similar 
categories—can be harmful to the victims of the bias, to the 
industry, and to society as a whole. These biases may 
manifest themselves directly or through more subtle 
channels. 
Direct biases are easy to identify. An industry that 
compiles its teams based on reputation will perpetuate 
biased team structures.92 For example, some evidence 
suggests that film crews are overwhelmingly (77.4%) male.93 
Thus, the pool of people who have any reputation as film 
crewmembers is going to be overwhelmingly male. Which 
will likely lead to a persistent skew toward male talent. 
An example of a more subtle indirect bias resulting from 
informal rules relates to the myth of the sole creator 
discussed above.94 This may seem on its face to be just about 
the nature of creation and not the identity of the creators. 
The norm might be an anti-collaboration norm or it might be 
a means of concentrating control of collaboration. But the 
bias problem goes deeper. There is significant evidence that 
this myth contains and enforces gender bias.95  
                                                 
91 See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of how bias can play into these 
decisions. 
92 See DARNELL HUNT & ANA-CHRISTINA RAMON, 2015 HOLLYWOOD 
DIVERSITY REPORT (2015) (documenting widespread underrepresentation 
of minorities and women in the entertainment industry). 
93 Stephen Follows, Gender Within Film Crews, 
https://stephenfollows.com/reports/Gender_Within_Film_Crews-
stephenfollows_com.pdf (July 2014) (providing data on film crews on the 
2,000 highest grossing films from 1994 to 2013). 
94 Others might include norms about the quality of certain types of art 
such as fan fiction or romance novels. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 5. 
95 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 5 (collecting sources and noting the 
existence of gender bias in broader norms within the copyright space). 
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And the fact has not been lost on those in the creative 
industries. In the music industry, Taylor Swift, Solange 
Knowles, and Bjork have all been the targets of one-sided 
critiques of female artists for not producing their work all on 
their own.96 A recent controversy in the music industry 
highlighted the pervasive and gendered nature of the sole-
creator story. Kanye West challenged Beck to give his 2015 
Album of the Year Grammy to Beyoncé because, according to 
West, Beyoncé possessed more “artistry.” Within a few days, 
Beck defenders argued that he was more deserving of the 
award than Beyoncé because “Beyoncé used a team of 25 
writers and 16 producers. Beck just one: himself.” Some 
went on to note that Beck even “sang and played 17 
instruments [while] Beyoncé [merely] sang.”97 The 
implication was that Beck was a real artist because he was a 
sole creator. As this meme spread, a backlash arose that 
rightly criticized it for misunderstanding the meaning of 
artistry and importing the sole-creator myth with its sexist 
undertones.98 
One final consideration is the effect of reputation 
penalties on hold up. Threats to breach or terminate a 
contract can create valuable incentives for parties to 
perform. On the other hand, they can also create hold-up 
value if one party threatens to breach after the other has 
committed time and resources to relationship-specific 
investments. Reputation is no different. A threat to destroy 
someone’s reputation is as much a hold-up threat as a threat 
to terminate a supply contract. This is to say that just as 
                                                 
96 See Forrest Wickman, It’s Not Just Bjork: Women are Tired of Not 
Getting Credit for Their Own Music, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2015). 
97 See, e.g., Peter Vincent, Grammys 2015 Comment: Beck Trumps 
Beyoncé for Artistry, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 10, 2015), 
http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/grammys/grammys-2015-
comment-beck-trumps-beyonce-for-artistry-20150210-13afqb.html. 
Similarly, BuzzFeed provided five reasons that Beck was better than 
Beyoncé, including as number three (under the heading “His artistry”) a 
list of the 25 writers on Beyoncé’s album next to Beck’s name all by 
itself, and as number four (under the heading “His artistry (again)”) a 
picture of a fourteen instruments that Beck played on his album next to 
a lone microphone for Beyoncé. Jack Shepherd, 5 Reasons Why Beck Beat 
Beyoncé, BUZZFEED (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/expresident/why-beck-beat-
beyonce#.xnWKM13y3. 
98 See, e.g., Darren Levin, Stop Questioning Beyoncé’s Artistry to Make a 
Point about Beck, FASTER LOUDER, (Feb. 11, 2015) 
http://www.fasterlouder.com.au/features/41866/Stop-questioning-
Beyonces-artistry-to-make-a-point-about-Beck.  
31 
 
contracts are incomplete, so too are mechanisms for 
enforcing informal rules. 
B. The Special Case of Creative Collaboration Managed 
by External Informal Rules  
In previous work we demonstrated that ownership and 
authorship are often conflated in ways that cloud analysis of 
copyright law.99 The key question for the formal law of 
copyright is who owns the creative products. Doctrines that 
tie ownership to authorship misunderstand the nature of 
collaborative creativity and the role that ownership plays in 
creating a hierarchy to facilitate collaboration.100 We thus 
argued that the law ought to emphasize ownership and 
control, even at the potential expense of traditional notions 
of authorship.101  
Here we go further—even legal ownership and control 
often cannot be neatly linked. Reputation and trust 
frequently control creative production regardless of who 
owns the creative product. Where that is the case, formal 
law may not be playing much of a role at all in allocating 
control. Instead, when control cannot be found in 
hierarchical firms, management is disaggregated such that 
important managerial functions are found in networks of 
relationships created and governed by informal rules.102 
Thus, in addition to offering tools for a manager 
overseeing a hierarchical creative collaboration, reputation 
and trust might themselves allow for informal rules to 
substitute for the role of a manager in collaborative 
endeavors. While the team production theory of the firm 
emphasizes the need for a manager to observe inputs or 
enforce reward and punishment agreements when market 
contracting is not possible, it is plausible that under certain 
conditions, a manager is not required at all. Instead, 
informal rules backed by reputation and trust perform the 
                                                 
99 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
100 See Casey & Sawicki, note 6; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29; 
Balganesh, supra note 35. 
101 See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1713-26. 
102 On network governance theories in general see Bernstein, supra note 
79; Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly, & Stephen Borgatti, A General 
Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social 
Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGM’T. REV. 911 (1997).  
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monitoring or enforcement functions ordinarily performed by 
a manager. This creates a form of network governance.103 
The mechanism by which informal rules can substitute 
for a managerial hierarchy is as follows: the reputation of 
the team as a whole provides the binding mechanism. If a 
team never works and collapses in bickering, the world is 
likely to see this. Outsiders may have no way of observing or 
verifying which team members caused the collapse. But they 
do know that the team members did not work well together 
or at least that the team failed to produce. This harms the 
reputation of all team members, providing an ex post 
penalty to the entire group for failure to perform—the team 
that produces a bad movie bears a collective reputational 
hit.104 In these scenarios, the manager is not necessary—
informal rules enforced through reputation by a kind of 
network governance fill the manager’s role instead.105  
The threat of this industry-imposed reputational penalty 
may create an ex ante incentive for all parties to perform 
                                                 
103 Theories of network governance have been explored deeply in the 
management and sociology disciplines but less so in legal scholarship. 
Lisa Bernstein has recently provided an analysis of law and network 
governance in manufacturing industries. Bernstein, supra note 79. In 
part we are making a similar contribution to industries in the copyright 
space. Worthy of note is that the framework for network governance is 
dramatically different in the two contexts. Where the creative networks 
that enforce informal rules are themselves structured and created by 
informal networks (contracts do not specify how the network will be 
connected or the rules it will follow), Bernstein finds that some 
manufacturing industries have complicated contracts that form the 
framework and reference points for their network governance. The 
network that enforces the informal rules has behind it detailed formal 
contracts that provide an idea of what is acceptable behavior. We suspect 
that the difference lies in the four factors we have identified throughout 
this article. Where uncertainty, observability, verifiability, and 
allocation are low (as they are for creative production) it is even difficult 
to use formal law and contracting as the backbone for creating or guiding 
a network. The same is not true in the manufacturing industries.  
104 See Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, supra note 102, at 931-32 (describing 
collective sanctions that can be imposed industries including film). 
Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti describe this phenomenon with an 
anecdote about the film failure of Heaven’s Gate. The movie’s 
extraordinary failure resulted in a sanction such that virtually the entire 
team was excluded from the film industry for some period of time. Id. 
Something like this may also explain the career trajectories of some of 
the participants involved in other notorious flops like Cutthroat Island 
and Batman Forever. 
105 A simpler version of this may also encourage positive team behavior 
without a manager when the team members fear a trust or reputation 
sanction directly from the other members of the team. 
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optimally in the collaboration. This can be understood as a 
form of the group penalty that Holmström identified as a 
prime facilitator of team production.106 The penalty would be 
self-executing and, indeed, may be an example of a penalty 
enforcement that can exist without an actual manager in 
place.  
We do not suggest that such a phenomenon is unique to 
copyright.107 We do, however, suggest that it is particularly 
widespread throughout industries regulated by copyright 
law. Informal rules flourish when there are thick 
relationships with repeated interactions within a given 
community. Expressive creation is pervasively 
collaborative—thus requiring such thick relationships with 
those repeated and close interactions.108 And formal law is a 
weak tool for facilitating that collaboration. Because 
ownership is a construct of formal law that does not track 
the relationships at the heart of creative collaborations, it 
cannot provide the control rights that are necessary for 
organizing productions, even at the core of the copyright 
space. 
What matters in creative production is actual control, 
which cannot be fully allocated by legal ownership or by 
contract. Formal law can provide mechanisms that 
managers use to increase control on the margins.109 But it 
cannot sufficiently allocate the core of control rights 
necessary to create a film, a television show, a play, or 
communal folklore.  
For example, a contract might say that a producer “owns” 
the rights of final cut. That is, formal law grants the 
producer the right to decide when the film is done. The 
truth, though, is more complex. Perhaps in any given 
                                                 
106 See Holmström, supra note 51, at 338–39. 
107 Examples of non-integrated non-contractual relationships that 
function like a Coasean hierarchy can be found in many industries: 
MACCAULEY, supra note 9; ELLICKSON, supra note 9; Bernstein, supra 
note 79; Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of 
“Team” Production of Corporate Governance, 38 SEATTLE L. REV. 365 
(2015). 
108 Others have also suggested that uncertainty and volatility leads to 
repeat interactions. See, e.g, Faulkner & Anderson, supra note 54 
(providing evidence on the uncertainty of and recurrent relationships in 
the film industry). Some of the underlying causes of such uncertainty 
can arise from the creative nature of the projects we discuss in this 
paper. Id. 
109 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6, at 1713 (discussions regarding the 
derivative works right and work made for hire doctrine). 
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instance, a producer can in principle exercise final cut 
however she desires. But it is also true that doing so may be 
her last act as a producer who has access to any talent in the 
film industry. It is then just as true as a practical matter to 
say that the film industry or the Hollywood network as a 
whole has residual control over the final cut.  
This is why a producer who provides creative inputs can 
be trusted to act appropriately even though that producer 
ostensibly sits at the top of the hierarchical firm making the 
film. In reality, the hierarchy has additional levels above 
and outside of the firm—the managerial function is 
disaggregated, with some elements remaining within the 
firm (e.g., allocating revenues generated by the film or 
deciding when the film is complete) and others distributed 
throughout the community (e.g., allocating reputational 
rewards associated with the film or punishing misuse of 
final cut authority). 
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FORMAL LAW AND 
INFORMAL RULES FOR CREATIVE COLLABORATIONS 
Informal rules do not, of course, operate in isolation. 
Even in contexts where informal rules generally facilitate 
creative collaborations—as we think they do in the 
American television and film industries—there will 
nonetheless be particular instances where, for one reason or 
another, collaborations fail. When they do, formal law and 
informal rules at the intersection of authorship, ownership, 
and control may attempt to mediate the conflict. In this 
Part, we apply our analysis to illustrate the possible 
interactions between formal law and informal rules, and to 
identify some tradeoffs involved in regulating the 
organization of creative collaboration.  
A. When Informal Rules Fail: Garcia and Merkin 
Copyright law contains two primary mechanisms to deal 
with creative works that are the product of contributions 
from multiple creative inputs. The default mechanism is the 
joint works rule, which applies to works “prepared by two or 
more authors with the intention that their contributions be 
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.”110 In these instances, each “author” is a co-owner of 
                                                 
110 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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the copyright in the work.111 Parties may, however, contract 
out of this co-ownership default through the work made for 
hire doctrine, which provides that contributors to a creative 
collaboration may contractually assign their authorship (and 
resulting ownership), thus allowing parties to opt into 
consolidated authorship, ownership, and control.112 
Difficult problems, however, arise when the parties fail to 
opt into the work made for hire regime, and the joint works 
rule does not cleanly apply. Among other scenarios, this can 
occur when creative inputs disagree about what, precisely, 
the “work” is.113 The director and producer of a film may, for 
example, disagree about whether a given scene should be 
included in the completed version. In such a case, there will 
be two films, one including the director’s scene and the other 
including the producer’s scene.  
Formal copyright law may have trouble resolving these 
disagreements in a satisfying way because it is designed on 
the assumption that the parties agree what the “work” is.114 
Formal copyright law permits only the “author” of the work 
to decide whether a particular scene makes it in. But it 
determines who is the author by looking to who has the 
authority to decide whether a particular scene makes it in. 
The question in the toughest cases is which of two plausible 
works—each with its own supporters within the 
collaboration—prevails. Formal law becomes circular when 
the question of which version prevails is answered by 
determining who decides which version prevails and the 
question of who decides which version prevails depends on 
which version is being assessed.  
To see how this problem plays out, consider two recent 
cases presenting precisely those scenarios. In Garcia v. 
                                                 
111 17 U.S.C. § 201. 
112 17 U.S.C. § 101; 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
113 For another scenario, see Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th 
Cir. 2000). In that case, the question was not which of two competing 
versions prevailed, but who was entitled to control the value of an 
agreed-upon version. Id. at 1230. Like Garcia and Merkin, though, the 
court dismissed the copyrightable contributions of one of the creative 
inputs to the collaboration in favor of consolidating control through 
formal law. Id. at 1236. And it similarly implies that the work made for 
hire doctrine’s requirement of an agreement in the case of non-employee 
contributors is a dead letter. 
114 Defining the “work” for purposes of copyright law is a complex and 
undertheorized problem. For an interesting analysis revealing the 
complexities, see Margot Kaminski & Guy Rub, Framing Copyright 
(draft on file with the authors).  
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Google,115 Cindy Garcia was cast for a cameo in what she 
thought was an action-adventure film titled Desert Warrior; 
it turned out that the film was “an anti-Islam polemic called 
Innocence of Muslims.”116 Garcia’s lines had been dubbed 
over so she appeared to say “Is your Mohammed a child 
molester?”117 When the film was released on YouTube, 
Garcia received death threats, and she sued the filmmaker 
and Google for copyright infringement, seeking an injunction 
preventing the distribution of any version of the film that 
included her performance.118 Garcia argued that she was the 
sole author of a standalone copyright in her “performance.” 
What she sought, in effect, was the ability to define the work 
as consisting solely of the scene in which she participated; 
the director, Mark Basseley Youssef, sought to define the 
work as the larger film Innocence of Muslims, including the 
scene in which Garcia participated.119  
The Ninth Circuit en banc sided with Youssef’s definition 
of the work.120 Apparently adopting the Copyright Office’s 
view that the production of a motion picture results in only 
one copyrightable work,121 the court noted first that a 
“performance” does not fall within the statutory list of 
examples of “works of authorship.”122 Moreover, Garcia did 
not contribute more than a “minimal level of creativity or 
originality” when she performed her part.123 As a result, her 
performance was not a “work of authorship” to which 
copyright might attach.124 And to the extent that anything 
incorporating her performance was a “work” entitled to 
copyright protection, she was not its author because she was 
not the person under whose authority that larger work was 
fixed.125 
Note, however, the circularity. The underlying question 
the court had to resolve was whether Garcia or Youssef had 
the right to decide whether Innocence of Muslims would 
                                                 
115 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
116 Id. at 737. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 737-38. 
119 Youssef himself did not participate in the litigation. But we can take 
the version of the film he released on YouTube as the version of the work 
that he deemed final. 
120 Id. at 740. 
121 Id. at 741.  
122 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
123 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742-43.  
124 Id. at 741-43. 
125 Id. at 743-44. 
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include Garcia’s scene. In order to answer that question, the 
court had to identify the author of the work. But it could not 
identify the author without first deciding what was the 
relevant work.126  
The Garcia court’s holding is perhaps sensible in the 
context of a five-second cameo performance. It seems 
untenable to conclude, as the dissent apparently implies, 
that every contributor in a film, no matter how small the 
contribution, has joint control over the final product.127 That 
would be a strange rule even if it were simply a default 
where parties can opt out. The more efficient rule is the one 
we think parties would overwhelmingly adopt: no control to 
the minor actor who speaks two lines for five seconds.  
But the court’s reasoning is problematic for at least two 
reasons. First, as the dissent points out, the court suggests 
that a filmed scene for a film is not a copyrightable 
“work.”128 It does not, however, tell us at what point in 
filming or editing something transforms from a separate 
input into the joint output: the ultimate work itself. Does 
this mean, the dissent asks, that every outtake of a film and 
every draft chapter of a book are fair game for copying? That 
cannot be true.129  
Second, the court’s holding that Garcia is not entitled to 
any copyright interests in her work leaves little room for the 
work made for hire doctrine.130 In the presence of an 
appropriate agreement, that doctrine would take copyright 
ownership out of the actor’s hands and put it in the 
                                                 
126 If the work were a version of Innocence of Muslims without Garcia’s 
scene, then Youssef could not have been the author because he wanted 
that scene in. If the relevant work was – as the court ultimately viewed 
it – a version of Innocence of Muslims including Garcia’s scene, Garcia 
could not be the author—after all, her argument was that she did not 
want her scene in the film, and her inability to excise it from the work as 
a whole was what led her to seek relief in court. 
127 Id. at 743. 
128 Id. at 749-50 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
129 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or 
phonorecord for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of 
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time 
constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been 
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate 
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130 786 F.3d at 751 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that “[a]ctors 
usually sign away their rights when contracting to do a movie, but 
Garcia didn’t and she wasn’t Youssef’s employee”). 
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director’s (or producer’s).131 But here there was no work 
made for hire agreement, and ownership is still being taken 
out of the actor’s hands and put into the director’s. The 
Garcia court’s analysis thus treats Garcia’s work as if it 
were subject to a work made for hire agreement, even 
though it plainly was not. What then is the doctrine doing 
for film actors? Perhaps none. But that would render the 
statutory requirement of an agreement (for non-employee 
contributors like Garcia) a dead letter.  
The difficulty then is that both the majority and the 
dissent present untenable options. Formal law gives us two 
possibilities. First, input providers are not creating 
copyrightable works, in which case those providers get 
nothing. Second, every input provider is an author with 
control over any final product that includes the inputs. 
Those two possible rules replicate neither the intent of 
parties involved in most film relationships nor any 
hypothetical efficient transaction.  
The reason for the disconnect is that most relationships 
in the film industry have deep and nuanced terms that are 
set by and enforced through informal rules. And the formal 
law cannot do better than those rules. It can only do worse—
which is precisely why the parties opt for informal rules in 
the first place. Formal contracts are difficult to write and 
judicial enforcement is insufficient when the contract is 
about creativity and the key aspects of the performance 
suffer from an absence of observability, verifiability, 
allocability, and certainty. 
We do not mean to suggest that the arrangements in 
Garcia were part of the normal film industry. Perhaps it is 
precisely because Garcia and Youssef were operating so far 
outside the reach of the industry’s informal rules that the 
dispute arose. But the formal law that is developed in the 
case now nominally applies as the formal law of the normal 
film industry, and that is what makes the reasoning 
potentially harmful. 
Indeed, the implications of Garcia become more difficult 
to resolve if they are applied to a standard Hollywood 
                                                 
131 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The doctrine can also apply in the absence of an 
agreement to scenarios in which an employee performs work within the 
scope of employment, but those kinds of scenarios would not apply in the 
ordinary film context. See CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (limiting 
the application of the work made for hire doctrine in the absence of an 
agreement to scenarios in which “a hired party is an employee under the 
general common law of agency”). 
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context. After Garcia v. Google, the Second Circuit in 16 
Casa Duse v. Merkin faced just such a scenario.132 Robert 
Krakovski, the owner, operator, and principal of 16 Casa 
Duse LLC, bought the rights to the screenplay Heads Up.133 
He asked Alex Merkin to direct the film.134 Throughout 
production, Krakovski and Merkin negotiated a work made 
for hire contract, but they ultimately could not agree.135 
Krakovski continued pursuing one version of the film, while 
Merkin had an alternate version.136  
Krakovski then sued Merkin, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that 16 Casa Duse was not liable for copyright 
infringement and that Merkin had no copyright interest in 
the film.137 The parties agreed that Merkin was not a joint 
author of the Krakovski version and that the work made for 
hire provision did not apply.138 The case thus explicitly 
posed the question what, precisely, is the work of authorship 
to which copyright protection attaches?  
                                                 
132 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015). Because the informal rules are so 
pervasive and powerful, few disputes involving major industry 
participants will reach the point at which a court of appeals issues an 
opinion. Indeed, most of the disputes will be resolved within the industry 
itself. Still, in at least some cases, the disputes will at least spill into the 
public eye, even if they do not reach the courts of appeals. For some 
recent examples, see Eriq Gardner, Director of Nina Simone Film Sues 
over Production Company’s Hijacking (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER, Mar. 4, 2016, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/director-nina-simone-film-sues-704230 (describing filmmaker’s 
allegations that production company improperly took control of editing 
film); ‘London Fields’ Premier in Toronto Troubled by Creative Rift, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/business/media/london-fields-
premiere-toronto-troubled-by-creative-rift.html (describing fight between 
director and producer regarding which version of the film is suited for 
distribution). For an older example, see the disputes regarding Blade 
Runner. Will McCarthy, Do Filmgoers Dream of Director’s Cuts?, SCI FI 
WEEKLY, Oct. 15, 2007, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090319034524/http://www.scifi.com/sfw/col
umn/sfw17153.html. The judicial resolution of cases like Garcia and 
Merkin will be problematic because they will shape how other disputes 
are resolved by informal rules even when they do not reach the courts.  
133 791 F.3d at 251. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 251-52. 
137 Id. at 253. 
138 Id. at 255-56. 
40 
 
Merkin offered two possibilities: his directorial 
contributions or the existing film footage.139 For our 
purposes, the second is of particular interest.140 At the time 
of the litigation, there were at least two, and perhaps three, 
versions of the movie: (1) the raw footage shot by Merkin; (2) 
an edited version completed by an editor retained by 
Krakovski; (3) and (perhaps) an edited version cut by 
Merkin.141 The court’s analysis appeared to treat the raw 
footage as the locus of whatever copyright protection arose 
from Merkin’s and Krakovski’s collaboration.142 According to 
the court, because none of the multiple author scenarios 
contemplated by the Copyright Act applied, the answer to 
who owned that copyright in the raw footage turned on who 
was the “dominant author.”143  
That inquiry, however, would not be answered by 
investigating which of the putative authors occupied the 
mastermind role with respect to creative decisions; instead, 
the Merkin court looked for which of the parties could best 
be understood as the manager in the team production sense. 
Thus, although “Merkin exercised a significant degree of 
control over many of the creative decisions” including 
“decisions related to camera work, lighting, blocking, and 
actor’s wardrobe, makeup, and dialogue delivery,” Krakovski 
prevailed because he “initiated the project; acquired the 
rights to the screenplay; selected the cast, crew and director; 
controlled the production schedule; and coordinated (or 
attempted to coordinate) the film’s publicity and release.”144 
Krakovski appears to have made none of the creative 
decisions we typically associate with the author’s role in the 
                                                 
139 Id. at 255. 
140 As to directorial contributions, the Merkin court reasoned that 
individual creative contributions to a collaborative work could not be 
“works of authorship” entitled to protection. This analysis was based on 
statutory interpretation that was neither obvious nor inevitable and 
further reflects courts’ tendencies to concentrate authorship, ownership, 
and control. Because it largely tracks the Garcia court’s analysis of 
Garcia’s claim to copyright in her performance, we set it aside here. 
141 Id. at 251-53. 
142 Id. at 259 (noting Merkin’s contention that “he and not Casa Duse 
owns all copyright interests in the ‘raw film footage’” and recognizing 
that “the film footage is subject to copyright protection” and reasoning 
that the “unedited film footage” was the “portion of [the work] that ha[d] 
been fixed at [this] particular time” and proceeding to evaluate “the 
ownership of any such copyright”). 
143 Id. at 260-61. 
144 Id. 
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production of expressive works—he did not write the story, 
perform the roles, guide the actors’ in their interpretation of 
the text, or decide how to frame a shot. Instead, he did what 
a team production manager would do: decide the scope of the 
project and determine membership in the team.  
The outcome may be a reasonable resolution of the 
circumstances in this particular case. But the legal doctrines 
that get the court to its outcome are troubling and may 
frustrate the parties’ desired relationships if applied in other 
cases. The court creates the fiction of a dominant author and 
then that label is bestowed on the party exercising the 
fewest acts of creative authorship. It must do this to reach 
the consolidation of formal ownership and authorship that 
formal law insists on, despite the fact that the parties did 
not (jointly) desire it nor did they contract for such neat 
consolidation on their own. 
Underlying these cases is the subtle question of 
competing visions of a work. Both Garcia and Merkin 
rejected claims to authorship in part because the claimants 
did not have the authority to say what the work is. In 
Garcia, Cindy Garcia had no ability to say whether her 
scene would be part of the film, or even what she would be 
saying in that scene. In Merkin, Casa Duse was the one that 
determined what story would be told, and that sufficed to 
establish its claim to authorship status under formal 
copyright law (as well as the ownership and control that 
followed). 
But this elides the deeper question about what happens 
when collaborators disagree about which story is going to be 
told. This question lurks beneath the surface of Merkin. If 
our focus is on the raw footage, it seems plausible if not 
inevitable to think that Krakovski would be the author. The 
version edited by Merkin, however, seems of a different 
sort—in what way can we view Krakovski as the author of a 
version of the film that he did not approve of? Perhaps 
Merkin’s version of the film infringes on Krakovski’s, raising 
again the old Anderson question of what happens to the 
original portions of an unauthorized derivative work.145 But 
it is hard to view Krakovski as the author of a version of the 
film that he does not believe should exist at all. Formal law 
does not offer a satisfying way out of this puzzle. 
B. When Informal Rules Work 
                                                 
145 Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 1989). 
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1. Anecdotes from Industry Participants 
In most industries where creative collaboration is 
pervasive, informal rules will usually work well enough. For 
example, several independent film producers have reported 
that, at least sometimes, informal rules (and not formal 
contract terms) regulate the organization of creative 
collaboration.146 In these cases, rights to ideas were 
allocated not by confidentiality agreements and submission 
releases, but by reputation—often filtered through 
intermediaries in the form of agents and managers—and by 
trust. Thus, pitches for proposed films took place informally 
between filmmakers and producers who either knew each 
other personally or were introduced to each other by a 
trusted third party (usually an agent, but sometimes 
another producer) who could vouch for the behavior of the 
filmmaker.  
Similarly, some producers described a system where 
performance obligations of actors, writers, and directors 
were controlled almost exclusively by industry expectations. 
Bad behavior—rejecting suggested revisions without 
adequately considering them, allocating insufficient time to 
the project, storming off the set, and the like—resulted in 
penalties applied through reputation and trust, rather than 
through formal legal action. Producers communicated with 
each other about which actors work well in teams, which 
writers produce weak drafts, and which directors poison the 
environment on the set. 
Producers themselves were sometimes bound little by 
their contracts but greatly by community restraints. Thus, 
producers described arrangements where they had the 
formal contractual right to final cut (the right to decide 
which version of a film is released) but felt that informal 
rules prevented them from exercising those rights in all but 
the most extreme circumstances. The improper use of final 
cut would result in severe reputational penalties and a 
resulting inability to attract new talent. 
Importantly, the contracts in these cases did not provide 
that filmmakers get to decide when a film is done. And they 
did not provide that the right transfers to the producers only 
                                                 
146 The description in the following sections is based on conversations we 
have had with producers in the independent film industry and an editor 
in the literary incubator industry. Like the reported cases discussed 
above, these are anecdotal examples to demonstrate how the 
mechanisms we have discussed might work in practice. 
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in circumstances involving wrongdoing by the filmmaker.147 
But the relationships functioned as if those terms were 
included. In this way, an informal rule—and not the formal 
law of contract—dictated the most central organization for 
creative control.148  
2. Reputation Networks and Agents as Reputation 
Intermediaries 
The mechanisms we have discussed require strong social 
networks. Participants in the film industry cannot rely on 
reputation unless reputational information can be 
transmitted at a reasonable cost. One producer told us, 
unsurprisingly, that much of this is facilitated through 
industry relationships that are developed through social 
events.149 We suspect that talent agents are crucial to these 
networks.  
                                                 
147 In cases when a very powerful filmmaker obtains final cut rights, 
those rights are often conditioned on the filmmaker satisfying various 
obligations; even so, disputes regarding final cut in those instances are 
rarely resolved by reference to contractual language. See Tatiana Siegel, 
Fade-out on final cut privileges?, VARIETY (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://variety.com/2010/film/news/fade-out-on-final-cut-privileges-
1118014187/ (quoting a “studio chief” as saying that “Even if you can 
find a way that they are in breach (of their contractual delivery terms), 
you are more than hesitant to take advantage. Putting aside what the 
contract says, you’re not going to take on Baz [Lurhmann] and take on 
that PR nightmare.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
148 The producers reported similar attributes in the organization of their 
relationships with writers. Our conversations with participants in the 
literary-incubator (or book-packaging industry) similarly indicated that 
informal rules play crucial roles organizing creative collaborations. 
When a group of authors brainstorms ideas for novels, there is a risk 
that an author will use the sessions to improve her own ideas and then 
defect from the group, taking her ideas with her. Instead, an informal 
rule dictates that any ideas disclosed during a session belong to the 
group. 
149 As he put it: When you are assessing someone’s potential, first you 
talk to agents, and then you get on the phone to call your industry 
friends, “which are different from your real friends.” The information 
gathered from these networks likely have dramatic effects. One producer 
told us that a director with whom he worked proved to be extremely 
difficult in the editing room. When the producer later received a call 
from a colleague interested in hiring the filmmaker, the producer told 
him to stay as far away as possible. The filmmaker was not hired. Of 
course, nothing is absolute. The same producer told us of a filmmaker 
who effectively walked off the set. Although her prior film was widely 
lauded, the producer said that this behavior would likely mean that no 
producer would hire her. He noted, however, that it was a hard case 
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Talent agents are often viewed with some skepticism. 
Providing the inspiration for such unlikeable characters as 
Ari Gold on Entourage, the agents nonetheless appear to 
occupy the central role of reputation repositories or 
intermediaries. Agents can develop trust with both the 
talent and the producers who may hire the talent. In this 
way they can connect two players who would otherwise have 
no basis for trusting each other.  
The intermediary role of the agent can add value in the 
following way: A producer may want to know if an actor is 
creatively talented and a team player. Evaluating creative 
talent depends on accessible information—the actor’s body of 
work can be viewed and judged (if producers are expert 
evaluators of talent).150 But evaluating whether an actor is a 
team player depends on largely inaccessible information—
the actor’s private interactions with other actors, directors, 
and writers cannot be streamed on Netflix.  
An agent, however, may specialize in aggregating 
information on both characteristics, and for many players. 
The agent can access private information about whether 
someone is a team player by serving as a trusted repository 
for it. An effective agent should be expected to know which 
producers can work well with which directors; which writers 
work well with micro-managing producers and which work 
well when left alone; which directors will work well with 
which big talent; and which casting specialists know how to 
fill out the rest of the team. And because the agent will work 
with an actor (or writer or casting specialist) on all projects, 
while a producer will work with the actor on only a subset of 
projects (and perhaps only one), the agent is better able to 
spread the costs of acquiring information across all of an 
actor’s projects. Thus, a producer need only keep in mind 
which agents are known to be good.  
On the other side of things, the agents can aggregate 
information about producers for the talent providers. This 
provides both information and a bonding mechanism by 
which producers can commit to good behavior. Mistreatment 
of talent—even if it is not legally actionable—will lead to a 
                                                                                                                  
because the person “might be so good that it is worth taking on the risk 
in the future.” In that instance, the talent’s misbehavior had reduced her 
value, but perhaps not to zero. 
150 This is subject to the constraint that for any given film, value cannot 
be easily allocated to a particular input. That said, producers may be 
expert allocators, and they may be able to evaluate over an entire body of 
work what cannot be done for any given work. 
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report to the agent. The agent can then collect this 
information, and either pass it on to others in the industry 
or simply refuse to refer top talent to the producer in the 
future.  
Moreover, the agents can also police the equality of 
treatment. While any given actor or director may not know 
how her peers are being treating by producers, the agents 
have a good sense. If the producer is suggesting conditions 
or perks that are not commensurate with industry 
standards, the agent will have a sense of this and can push 
back on the producers.151  
In all of this, one thing will be conspicuously absent: the 
contract term. An agent who gets it wrong will not be sued 
for breach. A writer whose draft strikes the wrong tone or 
who rejects suggestions out of hand will not be taken to 
court. And a producer who abuses final cut will be (largely) 
immune from any legal action. But these players all know 
that there is a code of conduct with which they are expected 
to comply. 
This is consistent with what has been found in other 
creative industries. Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von 
Hippel, for example, describe an instance in which a former 
employee of a famous chef “presented one of the chef’s 
recipes on TV without proper attribution.”152 This violated 
an informal rule providing that a chef must acknowledge the 
original source of a recipe. But the famous chef who created 
the recipe did not sue his former employee for violating the 
rule; instead, the famous chef sent a letter admonishing the 
                                                 
151 This looks a lot like network governance and information sharing in 
other contexts. See Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly, & Stephen 
Borgatti, A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions 
and Social Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGM’T. REV. 911 (1997). For example, 
in manufacturing, firms that make large relationship specific 
investments seek ways to bind each other to good behavior. In some 
cases, they go to great measures to create vast interconnected networks 
of valuable business partnerships that create information channels and 
reciprocal threat points. Misbehavior by any one party can lead to a 
costly expulsion from the networks. See Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Ordering, Social Capital, and Network Governance in Procurement 
Contracts: A Preliminary Exploration, (Feb. 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (providing an in depth picture and analysis of this 
phenomenon). In the film industry, the agent provides the connective 
tissue for the network. The information resides in the agent and the 
agent has the power to exclude players on either side from the network. 
That is not, however, to say that players cannot be excluded in other 
ways through other non-agent mechanisms. 
152 Fauchart and von Hippel, supra note 3, at 193. 
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former employee. Critically, he sent this “letter to a number 
of his colleagues, so that the community as a whole would 
learn of his former employee’s violation.”153  
The letter—and the reputational implications it carried—
enforced the informal rule demanding attribution for 
creators. In the Fauchart and von Hippel model, the 
attribution rule ensures that chefs have sufficient incentives 
to produce new recipes. In the absence of robust protection 
from formal intellectual property law, chefs who produce 
new recipes would be unable to capture the pecuniary 
rewards associated with those recipes because all other chefs 
could copy the recipes. But an informal rule requiring 
attribution could permit chefs who produce new recipes to 
capture non-pecuniary status rewards (and, possibly, 
subsequent pecuniary rewards associated with increased 
status) by demanding community recognition for the initial 
creator of a recipe. In this way, informal rules allocating 
status rewards to the creators of new works can provide the 
motivation to produce such works. 
While we do not reject their interpretation—indeed, we 
agree that their model provides at least some explanatory 
power for their observations—we emphasize a distinct role 
for these informal rules. In our model, the attribution rule 
facilitates the head chef’s role in organizing the creative 
collaboration that occurs in her kitchen. Suppose the recipe 
is the result of creative inputs from several (not too many) 
cooks in the kitchen. But it is hard to avoid shirking by the 
cooks in that kitchen team. The attribution rule might vest 
the head chef with control over the status rewards 
associated with a particular recipe—other chefs interested in 
hiring a cook can seek information from the original chef 
about the relative contributions of the team members. The 
attribution rule in effect identifies the repository of 
information, and the chef then uses her control over the 
reputational rewards (and punishments) she can apply to 
elicit collaboration from the cooks in the first instance. 
In these examples, the producer and the chef are in 
positions to dole out reputational rewards and penalties. 
And, when doing so, they use informal rules to regulate 
intra-team behavior. If the production of a recipe is a 
collaborative endeavor, with the head chef at the top of the 
hierarchy, then this ability to enforce penalties on team 
members (even after the collaboration is over) is an 
                                                 
153 Id. 
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important way in which the chef can manage the creative 
inputs—the other cooks in the kitchen. 
Thus, in the Fauchart and von Hippel model, informal 
rules provide incentives for creative work by ensuring that 
the right kitchen is credited with a recipe. Credit then 
provides non-pecuniary rewards in the form of increased 
status or pecuniary rewards. In our model, the informal 
rules allocate control to a head chef who can then ensure 
that the right cooks within a given kitchen receive rewards 
for their collaboration (or are punished for failing to 
collaborate). 
C. Conflicts Between Formal Law and Informal Rules 
Formal copyright law incorporates a romantic view of the 
sole author. This creates stark problems when non-Western 
cultures clash with the sole author myth that drives 
Western copyright law. In such cases, formal law may be in 
tension with the work that informal rules do (and vice 
versa), undermining types of creative collaboration that 
function well under one regime but poorly under another. 
Copyright litigation involving Aboriginal art in Australia 
provides a salient example of such clashes between formal 
copyright law’s notion of a single author-owner and informal 
rules of collaboration and communal control.154 Litigation 
there has pitted informal rules of Aboriginal communal 
authorship that evolved over centuries against a 
superimposed Western copyright law focused entirely on the 
single author.155  
For example, the notable case of Bulun Bulun v. R & T 
Textiles156 dealt with ownership and control over a painting 
derived from the communal folklore of an indigenous group, 
known as the Ganalbingu. Senior members of the 
Ganalbingu had, in accordance with their community 
standards, authorized John Bulun Bulun to paint the 
artwork using elements of the Ganalbingu’s sacred and 
ritual knowledge. Textile producers then copied the artwork 
onto fabric patterns. While those producers had admitted to 
                                                 
154 See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty., 86 F.C.R. 244, 246 (1998) (a 
leading Aboriginal art case where the court was faced with the question 
of whether the rights to a painting derived from communal folklore 
belonged to the community from which the folklore had been developed); 
see also Daniela Simone, Dreaming Authorship: Copyright Law and the 
Protection of Indigenous Cultural Expressions, (draft). 
155 Id. at 246; see also Simone, supra note 154. 
156 86 F.C.R. 244. 
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infringing Bulun Bulun’s rights, the representatives of the 
Ganalbingu claimed that the rights belonged to the 
Ganalbingu people in common, not Bulun Bulun in 
particular, and sued to vindicate those rights.  
An ordinary copyright analysis would have attempted to 
identify an author-owner of the original aesthetic expression 
in the painting.157 But there were so many contributors over 
so many years and with so many variations that it would 
have been futile in this case. And the informal rules were 
clear that no single author could control the folklore; 
instead, these senior members of the Ganalbingu, chosen 
and acting in accordance with established community 
standards, had the effective ability to permit or prevent use 
of the folklore. Western notions of sole author-owners of 
creative works cannot easily accommodate this type of 
collaboration. 
In the end, the Australian court intuitively recognized 
that control in this context was different from the Western 
notion of control. Enforcing legal rules of ownership could 
not get the control question right—the law on its face 
prohibited the informal rules from playing any role at all.158 
Recognizing “the inadequacies of statutory remedies under 
the Copyright Act as a means of protecting communal 
ownership,”159 the court concluded that while Bulun 
Bulun—the individual painter who physically fixed the work 
in its tangible medium—had a copyright (and the 
concomitant ability to prevent or authorize reproductions of 
the painting), he also had a fiduciary duty to exercise his 
rights to the benefit of the Aboriginal community.160  
Thus, while the Aboriginal community did not have a 
copyright in its folklore, it did retain some formal legal 
                                                 
157 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (extending copyright protection 
only to an expression, not to the underlying ideas); Feist Pubs., Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (requiring that a work be 
original—that is, contain at least minimal creativity and not be copied—
in order to qualify for copyright protection). 
158 As one scholar has pointed out in this context, “copyright law remains 
committed to a one-size-fits-all model of creativity that does not 
represent the variety of types of creativity that flourish in the modern 
world.” Simone, supra note 154.  
159 Bulun Bulun, 86 F.C.R. at 246. 
160 Id. In this particular case, because Bulun Bulun had already sued the 
infringers, there was nothing left for the court to do. As a practical 
matter that meant that the Ganalbingu people had no additional legal 
remedies. Id. It did however provide some power for indigenous 
communities to protect their rights in the future. 
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power: it could sue to enforce its informal rules against 
community members who create works based on that 
folklore. And, of course, the community retained the ability 
to use its informal rules to determine which of its members 
could create such works in the first place. Community 
members who create such works in violation of the informal 
rules prescribing who may create them can be punished by 
expulsion from the community or by lowered status within 
the community. Notably, however, the community appears 
to have no power over outsiders who might create works 
based on that folklore. 
The outcome of the case leaves many open questions, 
reflecting the complexities that arise from overlaying rigid 
formal law on informal creative communities.161 The 
Australian court refused to grant ownership of communal 
folklore to any party. It also rejected calls to create a 
constructive trust that would have allowed the community 
to control its communal folklore. At the same time, it 
invented a new fiduciary duty that forced members of the 
community to protect the value of the communal folklore. 
The practical difference between creating a trust and 
creating a fiduciary role is murky, but as a formalist legal 
matter the fiduciary duty merely defines the relationship 
between the community and its members while a trust 
would have required the court to take the radical (from the 
                                                 
161 Similar problems have been identified in other cultures. See David B. 
Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property 
Law and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can It Fit?, 25 
Am. Indian L. Rev. 93, 100 (2001); see also Angela R. Riley, Recovering 
Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous 
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175 (2000); Daniel J. 
Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred 
Intangible Traditional Knowledge, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467 
(2003); Rachael Grad, Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law: 
A Comparison of the United States and Australia, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT'L L. 203, 225-226 (2003); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under 
Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions 
Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United 
States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769 (1999); Cortelyou C. Kenney, Reframing 
Indigenous Cultural Artifacts Disputes: An Intellectual Property-Based 
Approach, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 526-27 (2011) (“Other 
countries including Panama, Nigeria, Tunisia, and the Philippines have 
passed ‘copyright-like’ laws allowing, inter alia, collective ownership of 
sacred indigenous objects, fee distribution to communities whose folklore 
serves as a source for creative works, and the criminalization of 
“intentional distortion” and misuses of folklore.”). 
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perspective of Western copyright law) step of allowing 
communal authorship to create a property right in art.162 
Bulun Bulun is not as far from the core of Western 
copyright as it might at first seem. Informal rules in the 
filmmaking community play a similar role to that played by 
informal rules in Aboriginal communities—the filmmaking 
community dictates rules of control for the various inputs 
into a film.  
To put the point more radically, Western notions of single 
authors and corporate legal personhood163 establish our 
formal notion of who owns a film—the output of the creative 
collaboration. And it thereby (attempts to) influence the 
inputs to that collaboration.164 But the community’s 
informal rules have much more to say about who controls 
the various aspects of that film and its inputs. The formal 
allocation of property ownership and contract rights is 
significantly disconnected from the reality of control, and the 
formal allocation will break down in situations where its 
assumptions about the creative process are violated, as they 
(likely) were in Garcia and Merkin.165 Moreover, if the 
formal laws were completely different and vested 
“ownership” of a film in the hands of the filmmaking 
community (in Hollywood as a legal person), we doubt the 
resultant use of those rights would look much different than 
the status quo.166  
A recent article by Abraham Bell and Gideon 
Parchomovsky treads territory adjacent to that explored in 
Bulun Bulun.167 In their provocative and thorough study of 
the area, Bell and Parchomovsky propose the use of a 
“Copyright Trust” to deal with some of the thorny issues 
posed by creative collaborations. The trust mechanism 
would allow a court to separate ownership and control of 
                                                 
162 Simone, supra note 154 (noting the adaptability of fiduciary duties 
relative to constructive trusts). 
163 Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29. 
164 See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 6. 
165 See supra Part IV.A. 
166 Similar community collaboration phenomenon may arise in the 
context of new Western media that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
See, e.g., Shun-Ling Chen, Collaborative Authorship: From Folklore to 
the Wikiborg, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y, 131 (Spring 2011); cf. 
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm 
112 YALE L. J. 369 (2002). 
167 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 29 (citing and critiquing Casey & 
Sawicki, supra note 6). 
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copyrighted material.168 The beneficial owners of the 
copyright would be determined based on contribution, while 
a trustee would be appointed to exercise complete control 
over the copyright.169 One might think of this as forced (or 
default) firm ownership. The court can create a firm and 
impose a manager at the top of the hierarchy. This proposal 
could be viewed as similar to the fiduciary relationship that 
the Australian court imposed in Bulun Bulun.170 
Bell and Parchomovsky noted that while their analysis 
addressed theoretical problems similar to those addressed in 
our analysis of formal law and collaboration, their proposed 
solution “may be viewed as antithetical to those espoused by 
Casey and Sawicki.”171 We agree with that characterization, 
and our analysis here of informal law widens the gap 
further.  
To be sure, in a world of pure formal law we see little to 
object to in the Copyright Trust proposal. But the 
introduction of informal law and the non-hierarchical 
governance we have theorized in this Article render a 
Copyright Trust proposal either destructive of collaborative 
creation or impossible to implement. Informal law can create 
a governance or control structure that exists without 
contract and without integration. It allows for adaptive 
governance rules to evolve in response to the diverse 
production inputs and roles that might be necessary for 
creative collaboration.  
A court imposing a Copyright Trust could destroy that 
governance system. Imagine a court attempting to allocate 
control over a film to one person and then allocating 
ownership shares based on creative input. Bell and 
Parchomovsky suggest that nothing in their proposal denies 
contractual solutions. But they do not address informal, non-
contractual solutions. If the court can allocate control to one 
person except in the presence of a contractual provision, 
then that would essentially destroy the role of informal rules 
altogether.172 Like the outcome in Bulun Bulun, this 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 While the Bulun Bulun court did not create a constructive trust, a 
fiduciary duty, of course, has many of the trappings of a trust 
relationship.  
171 Id. 
172 A similar concern in Bulun Bulun was that creating a property right 
owned in constructive trust for the Ganalbingu people would hinder 
rather than enhance communal creativity by placing the control outside 
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structure places legal constraints on informal mechanisms of 
control and favors rigid formal mechanisms over the flexible 
informal ones developed by the creative communities 
themselves.  
In cases like Merkin, their trust concept would produce 
strange results where control is wrested from those intended 
and understood to possess it by long standing norms and 
placed in the hands of a trustee who must then adjudicate 
the proper use of the materials to benefit the interests of all 
contributors (however broadly the notion of “contributors” is 
defined). If that power were actually exercised, it could have 
major adverse effects on the creative collaboration. Either 
every party would have to negotiate formal control 
agreements where informal rules have, in the past, sufficed 
or collaborations would cease. 
But that is not likely to happen. In reality, for the same 
reason that producers do not exercise final cut, we do not 
think a Trust structure is likely to have much impact. 
Informal rules are too powerful. The court might allocate 
control to one trustee, but that control would likely diffuse 
back out to the market. And contributors would be wary to 
involve a court for fear of exclusion from future projects in 
the industry.173 This is why we say the Trust might be 
impossible to implement. Much as a producer cannot freely 
exercise final cut authority within the bounds of the 
contractual provision, so too a trustee would not be able to 
freely distribute proceeds within the bounds of her fiduciary 
duty, nor would a participant in a creative collaboration be 
able to freely call upon a court to create a Copyright Trust. 
At best, the implementation of the Copyright Trust would 
forcibly allocate beneficial ownership (that is, compensation 
for contribution) where the contracts are vague while 
changing little about control. That outcome is not as 
problematic. But it does not address the key questions of 
control that are at the heart of the creative collaboration 
problem—the challenges of coordinating unobservable and 
uncertain inputs to creative production remain. 
                                                                                                                  
of the communal norms. It is not clear that the Bulun Bulun court 
avoided this problem when it created a fiduciary relationship. 
173 One might alternatively, take this analysis to suggest that the courts’ 
decisions in the high profile cases discussed above are unlikely to have 
major impact. The norms will in most cases control. The result is that we 
need not worry too much about the judicial errors. But we should still 
worry that we have little real understanding about what is going on in 
the space regulated by copyright law.  
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D. Crowding Out and the Cliff of Formal Law  
A final observation about the interaction of formal and 
informal law is important for copyright design. Formal 
intellectual property law is generally more one-size-fits-all 
than informal rules, which are created and enforced by the 
community to which they apply.174 Informal rules might, 
then, be better suited to facilitating a diversity of 
approaches to creative collaboration. 
For example, consider a chef who is deciding whether to 
collaborate on a recipe. If we protect rights in recipes the 
way we protect literature—according rights in the “fixed” 
output to someone labeled an “author”—we might see less 
collaboration.175 Assume that the law provided solid 
protection once a recipe was written down. In developing a 
recipe, a chef might not want to let anyone else know her 
thoughts until she is ready to transform it into that written 
form of expression.176 Pre-expression collaboration 
undermines protection because it provides others with 
access to ideas before those ideas are protected by law (just 
as co-authoring a novel does). The chef in such a world 
might instead decide to produce new recipes as a sole creator 
and shun collaborative efforts because collaboration exposes 
her to the risk that her collaborators will misappropriate her 
ideas.  
Somewhat counterintuitively, in a world with weaker 
formal protection for recipes, the (relative) cost of pre 
expression collaboration may be much lower. Once a dish is 
cooked anyone can copy it. The chef is just as vulnerable to 
the theft of the final recipe as to idea inputs into the recipe. 
To be sure, the chefs may not innovate at all if there is no 
protection. But informal rules have developed to provide 
that protection. And in contrast to formal protection of a 
final recipe that begins only when the recipe is complete, 
                                                 
174 See Perzanowski, supra note 3, at 585-87 (arguing that norms may be 
more responsive than formal copyright law to the incentives required to 
produce creative work in the tattoo industry); Oliar & Sprigman, supra 
note 3, at 1840-41 (making a similar argument with respect to stand-up 
comedy). See also Michael Carroll, One for All: The Problem of 
Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 856-
57 (2006) (describing the uniformity cost of copyright law). 
175 See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: 
Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007). 
176 Id. at 1131-32 (arguing that a dish would satisfy copyright’s fixation 
requirement once it has been cooked and the recipe written down). 
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norms enforced through reputation have no cliff effect (or at 
least a plausibly less dramatic cliff effect because the 
content and enforcement of the informal rules is fuzzier than 
that of the formal law) and are as likely to protect against 
input idea theft as to final recipe theft. In this way, formal 
law that imposes protections may alter the foundation of 
collaborative organization in complex and perhaps 
unpredictable ways.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the influence of 
informal rules on the production of creative work is far more 
significant than currently supposed. While the conventional 
wisdom holds that informal rules dominate primarily in 
areas like cuisine, stand-up comedy, tattoos, and magic, 
where copyright’s incentive effect is weak or nonexistent, the 
reality is that informal rules influence all areas of creative 
activity where there is collaboration; that is, all areas of 
creative activity. So even when copyright law’s incentive 
effect operates forcefully, as it does in film, music, and 
literature, informal rules likely have an enormous impact on 
the production of creative work through their regulation of 
the collaboration required to produce movies and songs and 
books. This conclusion significantly increases the scope of 
influence for informal rules in the creative industries. 
Much, of course, remains to be done. We have only begun 
to outline here the many potential interactions between 
formal law and informal rules with respect to collaboration. 
Our hypotheses should be rigorously tested with significant 
industry-specific exploration of creative work. This Article 
provides a framework for thinking about informal rules 
throughout the creative industries. Future work should 
build on that framework so that scholars and policymakers 
can obtain a more accurate understanding of copyright law, 
creativity, and collaboration. 
